

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

JULY, 1974

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# Current History

JULY, 1974

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*In this second of a three-issue symposium on political reform in America, seven articles examine the American two-party system—how it developed and how it works today. Reviewing the history of our two-party system, our introductory article concludes that “. . . the days when parties and candidates could take large segments of the electorate for granted . . . are fast drawing to a close. . . . Consequently, after decades of regarding our party system as a system in stable equilibrium, we should now view it as a most dynamic and uncertain element in the American political system.”*

## The American Party System in Perspective

BY DAVID W. BRADY AND RICHARD MURRAY  
*Associate Professors of Political Science, University of Houston*

A NEW POLITICAL PHENOMENON appeared in the United States of America between 1790 and 1830. This phenomenon was a democratic party system featuring political organizations competing for public power through the electoral process. It is significant to note that the emergence of the American party system was unplanned and generally undesired by the political elite of the day. Most influential Americans probably agreed with George Washington's warning to his countrymen at the close of his presidency about the evils of factionalism in the new nation. Even Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, architects of one of the first parties, had little pride in, or enthusiasm for, their own creation. A basic question thus presents itself: why, in the face of general elite hostility, did political parties emerge and take hold in the new republic?

The best answer is that these new parties performed certain functions that were required for the effective operation of the political system. The framers, in producing a new national constitution in 1787, outlined a government structure without attempting to specify how this structure would operate. Experience under the new Constitution rather quickly confirmed the need for some sort of political organization that could manage and direct the governmental process.

\* It should be noted that the "Republicans" of the 1790's are not related to the modern Republican party which appeared in the 1850's; on the contrary, these early Republicans were the ancestors of the modern Democratic party.

This need was first evident in Congress. Alexander Hamilton, Washington's Secretary of the Treasury, functioned as the effective political leader for the first administration. As such, he sought enactment of a series of controversial measures, including funding the defaulted Revolutionary War debts of the states, ratifying a pro-British treaty that placed the United States on the side of England against France in the gathering European confrontation, and chartering a Bank of the United States. To insure the passage of his program, Hamilton and his allies created a permanent congressional faction which was labeled the Federalist party. This group's success in the early 1790's predictably resulted in the organization of a counter-faction called the Republicans by opponents like Madison and Jefferson.\* As a result of these actions, by the time of Washington's Farewell Address in 1797, the first political parties had firmly established themselves within the government structure.

A second functional role the parties filled was structuring the electoral process. The legal procedures created by the states and the nation to direct the selection of leaders were inadequate, in many instances, to the practical requirements of the situation. The matter of presidential selection provides a good example. The Constitution provided that the states would select electors every four years who would then, by majority vote, choose the President and Vice President. Since there was no legal restriction on



how many candidates could seek the presidency, it was likely that this procedure would often produce no winner unless some method of drastically limiting serious candidates was found. Political parties, via their nomination devices, provided the prior structuring of choices essential for the operation of this, and many other, electoral mechanisms.

Finally, political parties offered cues or guidelines that individual voters could utilize in interpreting complex political events and in making numerous electoral decisions. Whatever the democratic ideal may have envisioned, in practice few voters had the time, inclination, information, or intelligence to understand the issues of the day or to assess individually the candidates seeking their votes. Parties greatly simplified these problems for voters. Candidates ran under party labels, labels which voters could associate with certain issue positions and with which they could personally identify. This expansion of the party system started in the 1790's and became more important in the 1820's when the triumph of Jacksonian democracy greatly increased the voting population and the number of offices filled by election.

The development of the party system from the 1790's to the 1830's proceeded sporadically rather than in a linear fashion. For a dozen years, starting in the mid-1790's, the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans contested for power in the nation and many states. Then the Federalists, failing to respond to the rising spirit of democratic equality, gradually faded into impotency. The so-called "era of good feeling" followed, in which the Republicans so dominated the political process that their nominees were virtually assured of election.

The social and political diversity of the nation reasserted itself in the 1820's. Andrew Jackson, denied the presidency by a vote of the United States House of Representatives in 1824, pulled together a coalition of state parties in support of his 1828 presidential bid. Jackson won, and his success, coupled with that of the Democratic party, led his opponents to coalesce into the Whig party. Thus, by the mid-1830's, the United States had a competitive party system comprised of two broad-based, rather decentralized, national parties. With the notable exception of the Civil War era, that pattern has persisted until the present.

### EQUILIBRIUM AND REALIGNMENT

Scholarly analysis of the American party system has

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17, 3-18. Also, Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29, 16-37. More extensive treatments of this theme can be found in Walter Dean Burnham's *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970), and in James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

stressed the stability and equilibrium of the parties, noting only occasional periods of significant change or realignment.<sup>1</sup> According to the predominant view, over long periods of time the two major parties will be in equilibrium vis-à-vis each other, with one party usually electorally dominant. Each party will consistently draw support from certain areas and groups of voters. In recent years, for example, Cook County, Illinois, and blue-collar workers have normally tended to vote Democratic, while upstate New York and business executives are normally Republican. Each party will take issue positions which distinguish it from the other party. However, the differences between the positions of the parties are often not great, thus giving rise to the often heard criticism that there is no real difference between the major parties. Voter patterns of party identification and party policy positions are relatively stable over time, and election results—particularly the results of congressional elections—reflect this stability in that one party usually maintains control of Congress for a long period.

Realigning or critical periods are those which change the pattern of equilibrium. These periods are preceded by the rise of an issue or a set of issues which cut across traditional party lines. Typically, the immediate reaction of the major parties is not to take a position on the new issues because they have supporters on both sides of the fence and taking a clear-cut stance would probably cost them electoral support. However, if the issues are not resolved, the major parties are usually forced to take a stand; otherwise they risk withering away as the Whigs did over the slavery issue. The emergence of a strong third party, which has taken a clear position on the issues at hand, is a good indicator to the major parties that they must come to grips with these issues. Ultimately, in dealing with the cross-cutting issue or issues, the major parties tend to assume opposed or polarized positions. In this case, the typical equilibrium between political parties no longer holds. In addition to the parties' polarization on issues, a considerable number of voters transfer their party allegiance. Traditional voting patterns are disrupted, and new electoral majorities and minorities emerge. Elections that reveal these issue—and voter—shifts are called realigning or critical elections. Such elections are characterized by intense feelings on the part of the electorate which typically result in a heavy voter turnout.

The new majority formed in a critical election should persist for a number of years. This point is important because in every election there is some change in the composition of the electoral majority, but in many instances this reflects only short-term factors that have little lasting impact on electoral patterns. Critical elections, by definition, herald new and relatively stable majorities.

Throughout the discussion of critical elections we

have used the term new majorities without reference to political parties because it is conceivable that a new majority might form within the existing majority party. However, the pattern in American politics has been that the new majority coalition is formed within the minority party. Thus the new coalition that emerged in the 1930's found its home in the Democratic party, which had been the minority party since the 1890's.

Partisan realignment has important policy implications for the political system. The new majority party that emerges from a realignment legislates in accordance with the positions it took regarding the cross-cutting issues. These policy changes are usually not reversed because the minority party, when it seeks to regain a competitive position, is generally forced to accept the broad policy framework that has been enacted by the new majority.

Realignments, with the accompanying policy changes, also perform important functions for the political system. That is, these realignments bring forth new public policies to deal with social or economic problems the old equilibrium could not handle satisfactorily. Critical elections are thus mechanisms through which tensions that have built up within the polity can be released without requiring major modifications in the political structure of the nation.

In summary, realignments are characterized by the rise of an issue or a set of issues which cuts across and disturbs the two-party equilibrium. As a result, the major parties ultimately take different positions on the issues, and a critical election determines which party has majority support. The shifting of voters between parties and the new public policies that are enacted by the new majority eventually establish a new party and a policy equilibrium that usually lasts for several decades.

### THREE MAJOR REALIGNMENTS

Historically, three major realignments have occurred in American party politics: the first in the 1850's, the second in the 1890's, and the third in the 1930's. A brief description of each follows.

The realignment of the 1850's ended the Democrat-Whig equilibrium established in the 1830's. The issue which cut across both parties and disrupted the stability of the party system was slavery. The Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and other bipartisan measures could not stop the inexorable march of the slavery issue. The inability of the existing major parties to deal with this divisive question was reflected in the formation of the Republican party in the 1850's. This new party drew support from northern Whigs and anti-slavery Democrats. The Whigs, hopelessly split on the slavery question, quickly faded from the political scene. The Democrats were also badly splintered by this unavoidable issue. Dis-

equilibrium in the party system was most evident in the 1860 election, when four major candidates sought the presidency. Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans emerged victorious, but since the South was not willing to accept the policy changes this portended, the Civil War ensued.

Helped first by the truncated nature of the union and then by the North's military success and the occupation of the South, the Republicans remained dominant until 1876. Then normal relations were restored between the former confederate states and the nation, and the Democratic party became competitive again. For the next 20 years, the "era of no choice" prevailed; control of Congress fluctuated from election to election, and presidential elections were more closely contested than they were in any other period in American history.

Even as the party system of the 1860's and 1870's was providing a climate in which America's rapid industrialization could flourish, the specter of agrarian revolt loomed in the background. The period of Credit Mobilier, the Tweed Ring, Jay Gould, John D. Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan was an era of cooperation between the politicians of both parties and those businessmen intent on conquering a nation. While this cooperation undoubtedly contributed to industrial development, many Americans came to question the direction of national policy. Those benefiting little from industrialization—Westerners and Southerners and cash farmers—found expression for their conflicts with business and industry in the Populist party which appeared in the late 1880's. The basic goal of the Populist uprising was the preservation of agrarian America and the rural myth against Eastern and European industrialists.

The electoral strength shown by the Populists in 1892 and the 1893 depression pushed the Democratic party toward Populist principles and positions. This trend culminated in 1896, when the Democrats nominated Populist William Jennings Bryan, adopted much of the third party's platform, and purged from the party dissidents who refused to accept these changes. Inter-party polarization was completed when the Republicans held fast to their position and expelled Populist-leaning elements from their fold.

Specifically, the Democrats of 1896 favored coining silver at a 16-to-1 ratio to gold and opposed protective tariffs for industry and the expansion of the United States sphere of influence in world affairs. Republicans took the opposite side on these issues. But the underlying question which tied these issues together and structured the election results was: who would prevail in determining national policy, the agricultural West and South, or the industrial East?

The Republicans assembled an election coalition of Easterners and Midwesterners, urban residents, blacks, and laborers to thwart the agrarian threat.

The Republican majority elected to Congress passed a protective tariff, began American expansion in the Caribbean, and finalized the gold standard. Never again would there be a serious attempt by agricultural interests to capture a party and the government. The realignment of the 1890's assured the industrial future of the United States.

The divisive issue which ended three decades of Republican dominance in national politics arose out of the Great Depression that began in 1929. The basic question that prompted realignment was: how should the government deal with the national economic disaster? The Democratic party took the position that the federal government should assume responsibility for managing the economy and counteracting the effects of the depression. The Republican party supported only minimal governmental intervention.

The elections of 1932 and 1936 showed that a majority of Americans favored the Democratic position of vigorous governmental intervention in the economy. The new Democratic majority was a coalition of have-not elements that included big-city ethnics, blacks, laborers, and Southerners—the groups most severely affected by the depression. The policy stance taken by the new Democratic Congress under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt included measures like social security, public works programs, welfare legislation, regulation of business, guaranteeing the rights of unions, and a regional development program in the Tennessee Valley. Such programs solidified the Democratic majority and resulted in the gradual acceptance, by the Republicans as well as the Democrats, of the idea that government should be active in solving both economic and social problems. A new equilibrium was thus established in American party politics.<sup>2</sup>

### PRESENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since the late 1960's, the question of whether the American party system is undergoing another critical realignment has frequently been raised. Substantial disagreement on this point prevails among students of the partisan process. For example, at least four distinct positions can be discerned on the nature and the extent of the change occurring in the present party system.

One view, stated by Kevin Phillips, holds that a new realignment is imminent.<sup>3</sup> The economic issues that divided the parties and the electorate from the 1930's to the 1970's, it is argued, are being replaced by a set of social issues. Phillips contends that the leadership and activist elements of the majority Democratic party are out of step with many of their normal electoral supporters on social issues like bus-ing and law and order. This gives the Republicans an opportunity, which he sees them eagerly accepting, to become the new majority party of the unpoor, the unblack, and the unyoung. The Nixon plurality of 1968 and majority in 1972 may be evidence that a coalition of social conservatives who support Republicans is supplanting the old liberal economic coalition that provided Democratic majorities for 40 years. Democratic analysts Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg accept Phillips' hypothesis as a real possibility and urge Democratic candidates and office holders to become "centrists" on social issues and to play up traditional bread-and-butter issues lest their party become a political minority.<sup>4</sup>

A somewhat different position is taken by Everett Carl Ladd, Jr.<sup>5</sup> Ladd agrees that the old liberal-conservative division on economic issues that underlay the modern party divisions is declining in significance. He foresees a new "cosmopolitanism-parochialism" split emerging within the electorate on issues like abortion, race relations, women's rights, and pornography. Given the pervasiveness of this division, the party system will probably have to adjust to this new reality, although Ladd provides little speculation on the shape or the nature of this adjustment. Besides survey data Ladd cites in support of his thesis, one could argue that some recent mayoral elections in major American cities have featured candidate and voter alignments along cosmopolitan-parochial lines. The triumphs of Sam Yorty in Los Angeles in 1969 and of Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia in 1971 might be viewed as parochial victories that cut across normal party lines. Conversely, the cosmopolitans might be said to have prevailed with John Lindsay in New York in 1969 and Tom Bradley in Los Angeles in 1973.

A third possibility, of course, is that no significant partisan realignment has occurred or is now occurring. Considerable evidence supports this position. Survey

(Continued on page 36)

<sup>2</sup> For evidence of the connection between critical elections and policy outcomes, see David W. Brady and Naomi B. Lynn, "Switched Congressional Seat Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 17, 529-543.

<sup>3</sup> See Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), especially part 6.

<sup>4</sup> Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970).

<sup>5</sup> See Ladd's *Ideology in America: Change and Response in a City, a Suburb, and a Small Town* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), especially pp. 341-350.

David W. Brady is the author of *Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973) and numerous scholarly articles on Congress and American politics. Richard Murray is the coauthor of *Texas Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) and several articles in professional journals on American politics.

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*"In the 1830's, a generation of men appeared whose primary occupation was politics, and with them came the spoils system. It was not that earlier politicians did not replace enemies with friends, but rather that the acceptance of such actions as part of the normal political process symbolized the major shift in American political culture between 1789 and 1840."*

## American Political Development: 1789-1840

BY WILLIAM G. SHADE

*Associate Professor of History, Lehigh University*

IN THE LATTER PART of 1840 the people of the United States witnessed a political spectacle that astonished foreign observers and has continued to confound historians. Most commentators have focused upon the "hard cider" and "huzzah" of the "Log Cabin" campaign, and have followed *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* in interpreting this election as one in which demagogic conservatives, like Daniel Webster, appropriated Democratic electioneering techniques to defeat their more popular opponents.<sup>1</sup> However, this election can also be viewed as an indication of the appearance of a new level of political development in the United States which featured political structures far more familiar to twentieth-century Americans than to those who had created the Republic a half-century earlier.

The 1840 campaign focused on the contest for the presidency between Martin Van Buren and William Henry Harrison, and was characterized by high levels of voter interest, well-developed party organization, and intense partisan response. The voters that year trooped to the polls in record numbers to cast their ballots either as Democrats or as Whigs. Sectional allegiances were generally thrown aside and two parties competed on relatively equal terms in every state in the Union except South Carolina. Yet it is unlikely that any of the Founding Fathers would have found the political arena a congenial environment.

In handling the first 50 years of American political development, historians have focused upon two related themes: the "advance" of democracy and the

"rise" of political parties. In discussing the "advance" of democracy we might properly talk in terms of ideas and the constitutional-legal environment which reflected them. Along with popular attitudes toward the political system, these make up the political culture of a nation.

### AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The origins of American political culture, while owing much to James Harrington, Algernon Sidney and John Locke, basically blended the dissenting tradition of the "true" Whigs, or Commonwealthmen, with the lessons accumulated in the course of managing colonial governments.<sup>2</sup> This meant that Revolutionary political theory was at once unified and diffuse; since the colonies, having different histories, interpreted the dissenting Whig tradition in slightly conflicting ways. The general situation was mirrored in the battles over the state constitutions and over the federal Constitution; groups with distinctive experiences and dissimilar frames of reference followed similar assumptions to contrary conclusions. Regardless of these differences, all sides were committed to republicanism.

The outlines of republicanism are generally well known, but two aspects of the Revolutionary ideology must be noted. While republics were characterized by the emphasis upon the people as the ultimate source of all legitimate government, just how a political community might be defined remained unclear, and the meaning of representation was in flux. Further, eighteenth-century Americans deemed republics to be exceedingly fragile, more open to aggression from without and corruption from within than other forms of government. Consequently, republics demanded a peculiar sort of social order and required citizens with an almost inhuman commitment to self-sacrifice in the name of the common good. It was this latter emphasis on what they called "virtue" that

<sup>1</sup> Robert Gunderson, *The Log Cabin Campaign* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957).

<sup>2</sup> Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Bernard Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).



lay at the moral center of revolutionary republicanism.<sup>3</sup>

This ideology emphasized the ideal of a relatively equal distribution of property, in a society in which basic equality was defined in terms of opportunity to gain and hold property commensurate to one's talent to use it. It implied a conception of politics whose existence was based upon the desire to protect the individual's property and liberty, although it attempted to transcend rather than to reconcile conflicting interests within the community.

The republican ideology was fraught with contradictions which could lead in opposite directions. In 1789, the emphasis was placed on a morality of social cohesion that demanded self-restraint on the part of the citizen. This stood in stark contrast to the rampant political individualism and social atomization that characterized American liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 50 years that separated the elections of Washington and Harrison, the political culture of the republic had been radically altered. Within the basic republican mold, the United States had moved from a politics of consensus to a politics of conflict.

Only two amendments were added to the federal Constitution during this period; yet this environment witnessed several radical changes, not the least of which was a movement toward uniformity. While the rules of the political game, even as late as 1800, differed widely from state to state, similar procedures and practices had been adopted almost everywhere within the nation by 1840.

The right to vote had been widespread in colonial America, but it was always limited by relatively modest property qualifications.<sup>4</sup> Such qualifications were designed to insure the individual's economic independence and his "stake in the society." The ideal electorate was composed of small property holders who would not sell their votes to the highest bidder but would cast them for the candidate who could

best represent the interests of their community. Under pressures generated by the evolving society, the definition of a "stake in society" gradually changed. Property qualifications were lowered and then abolished or replaced by a simple taxpayer qualification accompanied by a residency requirement. As a consequence, in 1840 the American electorate included all adult white males, except in the states of Rhode Island, Louisiana, and Virginia.

This, of course, did not mean that universal suffrage had been accomplished or that the political community was conceived to include all adult members of the society. Although the woman suffrage movement was coalescing to demand the vote, women were and would remain disfranchised. Similarly, free black men, who could legally vote in a number of states, protested helplessly, as free states as well as slave states deprived them of their rights. In the wave of constitutional conventions after 1840, each of these questions was agitated, but none was central. Rather, controversy focused upon the question of alien suffrage.

As the nation moved, albeit haltingly, toward universal suffrage, it also moved away from the idea of the representation of corporations or estates and toward political individualism.<sup>5</sup> The Revolution and its aftermath had not greatly altered suffrage requirements, but Americans generally accepted the idea of "people and property" as the basis of representation. While the Constitution retained a transmuted version of the traditional view, with equal representation of the states in the Senate, the creation of a national executive and a popularly elected House of Representatives were major steps toward political individualism as expressed in the slogan "one man, one vote."

However, in 1800 only two states chose electors by popular vote and most congressmen were elected at large or from multiple member districts. In the states, local government was generally appointive, and governors were little more than creatures of the legislatures; urban areas and populous counties were generally under-represented. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that all this had changed by 1840, but major alterations had taken place. By 1840, only South Carolina was resisting the popular election of presidential electors; congressmen came from single-member districts, which were to become mandatory after 1842. Legally, the distance between the voter and the elected official was narrowed as requirements for office-holding were generally made similar to requirements for suffrage. While malapportionment continued to plague the state legislatures, increasing numbers of state and local offices were becoming elective. In all states except South Carolina and Virginia, holdouts against the nineteenth century, governors were popularly elected.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); John Howe, "Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790's," *American Quarterly*, 19 (1967), 147-65; Gordon Wood, ed., *The Rising Glory of America, 1760-1820* (New York: George Braziller, 1973).

<sup>4</sup> Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1820* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Robert Brown, *Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); Robert and Catherine Brown, *Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1964).

<sup>5</sup> J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

<sup>6</sup> Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), serves not only as the source of this material, but of the entire article. It is an indispensable book.



Generally, the voting process was becoming somewhat easier. *Viva voce* voting gave way in most states to secret ballots, and with the appearance of political parties the use of printed ballots increased rapidly. Polling units were made smaller, and polling places became accessible. The confusing array of suffrage requirements for different offices gave way to a more egalitarian standard, although the generally democratic state of North Carolina still maintained different requirements for those who could vote for the governor and state senators.

Perhaps more important than any of these changes in the law was that shift in the political culture concerning attitudes toward one's representatives and the political process itself, referred to by historians as the "decline of deference."<sup>7</sup> Although the Revolution had brought some minor alterations in the class origins of politicians, most people had continued to defer to their social superiors and elect them to office. At the same time, a significant minority seem to have believed that it was not their place to participate at all. But by 1840, politicians of a very different sort were deferring to the voters who participated in the electoral process in record numbers.

Two changes had taken place gradually. The representative was no longer regarded as a superior individual who was to protect the interests of his community by the relatively independent exercise of his intellectual abilities. By 1840, he was viewed as a man who was to mirror at all times the will of the community he represented. The shift can be overstated in the contrast between the "detached statesman" and the "errand boy," but this catches the essence of the change.<sup>8</sup>

Of greater import was the shift in attitudes toward

political parties which took place during this half century. Although the Founding Fathers' concept of representation was in flux, they universally regarded political parties as illegitimate expressions of corrupt self-interest and purposely constructed a "constitution against parties." They used the words "party" and "faction" interchangeably to refer to informal alliances of selfish interests within the government that by their very nature lacked virtue and endangered the commonwealth. It was not until the 1830's that any sizable number of Americans were willing to accept the modern view of political parties as necessary instruments of interest-aggregation and conflict-resolution in a democratic state; and even at that time a strong anti-party tradition remained.<sup>9</sup>

Although colonial politics gave Americans some experience of popular elections and representative legislative bodies, nothing like modern mass parties existed. Certainly there were various forms of factionalism and, at times, there were consistent voting blocs in colonial assemblies. Regional blocs appeared in the Continental Congresses and the Confederation Congress, but only in a few cases were these related to other levels of the political system.<sup>10</sup> Colonial and Revolutionary politics were local in orientation and managed through informal structures controlled by local elites. One student of the formation of the Constitution has estimated that in 1787 there were 34 major factions in the 12 states that sent delegates to Philadelphia.<sup>11</sup>

## THE FIRST PARTY SYSTEM

With the adoption of the Constitution, a national political arena established the conditions under which national parties could arise, but the proto-parties of what is sometimes called "the first party system" were distinctly limited in scope. In order to gain support for the government and for the administration's proposals to meet the economic needs of the new nation, the Washington administration, acting principally through dynamic Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, sought to unite the "friends of government."<sup>12</sup> To do this, he urged acknowledged socioeconomic elites to support the new government to influence the new national Congress and to undercut the formation of centers of power outside the government.

Almost at the beginning of the new government, the regional blocs which had characterized the Confederation Congress reappeared, and the unrealistic assumptions of republican ideology could not stand the strain. Gradually, an anti-government coalition of interests developed in conflict with the policies of "the friends of government." The coalition increasingly called itself "the republican interest," and contrasted itself with the "corrupt federal party" that dominated the government.

<sup>7</sup> J. R. Pole, "Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy," *American Historical Review*, 68 (1962); 626-46; J. R. Pole, ed., *The Advance of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

<sup>8</sup> Richard Buel, Jr., "Democracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 21 (1964), 165-90; Pole, *Political Representation*.

<sup>9</sup> Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Ronald P. Formisano, *The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

<sup>10</sup> Jackson T. Main, *Political Parties before the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973); H. James Henderson, "The Structure of Politics in the Continental Congress," in Stephan G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973); H. James Henderson, "Constitutionalists and Republicans in the Continental Congress," *Pennsylvania History*, 36 (1969), 119-144.

<sup>11</sup> Forrest McDonald, *We the People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Jack P. Greene, "Changing Interpretation of Early American Politics," in Ray A. Billington, ed., *The Reinterpretation of Early American History* (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1969).

<sup>12</sup> Lisle Rose, *The Prologue to Democracy* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968) is the only book which approaches this process realistically.

After 1793, these loose coalitions in Congress developed into the Federalist and Republican parties, in response to the war in Europe that had grown out of the French Revolution. Political sympathies and economic policies divided members of Congress into Jacobins and Anglophiles, who came into bitter conflict over the Jay Treaty. In order to gain popular support for its position, each group was forced to devise a strategy to appeal to the electorate in the bitter contests for Congress and the presidency which characterized the remainder of the decade and culminated in the election of 1800.<sup>13</sup>

The Federalists had the advantage in that they controlled the federal government, and the government itself served some needed organizational functions. For their part, the Republicans had to construct an opposition party in an environment which regarded the endeavor as illegitimate. Relying on techniques similar to those used at the time of the Revolution—particularly using committees of correspondence—and governing themselves with the mantle of republican ideology, they struggled successfully to establish primitive structures to nominate candidates, gain financial support, and mobilize voters in most of the states.

The reward for the Republican effort was not only the elevation of Thomas Jefferson to the White House in 1800 and the subsequent Republican monopoly of that office, but also the Republicans' overwhelming dominance of Congress and their ascendancy to power in most of the states. Between 1804 and 1816, the Federalists were briefly revitalized by a younger generation, who constructed party structures similar to those created by the Republicans a decade earlier.<sup>14</sup> As a result, the Federalists regained control of several state governments and increased their delegation in Congress. Between 1811 and 1815, there was a higher

degree of partisanship in Congress than at any time during the previous decade.

However, the "first party system" generally languished in what one historian calls "a stage of arrested development." In the Western states, nothing resembling organized parties ever existed, and the South after 1800 was politically monolithic. Even when organized parties seemed to exist they were badly rent by factionalism and conflicting sectional interests.<sup>15</sup> Party identity was often difficult to discern, and in Congress partisanship apparently structured voting patterns only in extreme crisis. The relationship between parties in federal politics and parties in state politics was extremely tenuous in most areas. Although conflict between the Federalists and Republicans caused a moderate rise in party membership in the late 1790's and a more rapid advance between 1804 and 1816, Federalists and Republicans remained, at best, proto-parties, lacking many of the structures and unable to fulfill most of the functions associated with modern political parties.<sup>16</sup>

After 1815, even these remnants of proto-parties degenerated. In scattered areas, men still ran for office as Federalists, and in a few states the Federalist organization remained intact, but political conflicts during these years reflected factional quarrels among men who called themselves Republicans. In Congress, sectional blocs (sparked by the controversy over the Missouri Compromise and the revitalization of states' rights sentiments throughout the South) and coalitions of regional economic interests, rather than parties, determined the success or failure of such legislation as the various tariff measures or proposals for internal improvement.<sup>17</sup> Even more complex patterns of local interests and intrastate sectionalism continued to dominate state policies until well into the 1830's.

The "birth of mass political parties" was the result of an inordinately long labor. Building on the foundations of the first party system, it began slowly in the mid-1820's and was not completed until 1840. In its

(Continued on page 40)

<sup>13</sup> Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); Joseph Charles, *The Origins of the American Party System* (Williamsburg: Institute for the Study of Early American History and Culture, 1956); William Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

<sup>14</sup> David Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); James Banner, *To the Hartford Convention* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

<sup>15</sup> Winthrop Jordan, *White Over Black* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

<sup>16</sup> James S. Young, *The Washington Community, 1800-1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

<sup>17</sup> This position established by Frederick Jackson Turner and his students years ago has been sustained by Charles Sydnor, *The Development of Southern Sectionalism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), and Richard Brown, "The Missouri Crisis, Slavery, and the Politics of Jacksonianism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 65 (1966), 55-72.

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*"... enduring parties and a solid economic foundation were the important legacies of the nineteenth-century political system to twentieth-century America."*

## The American Political System: 1840-1890

BY LESTER G. LINDLEY

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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM from the Jacksonian era through the end of the nineteenth century had a mixed record. Rapid economic development, the unquestioned acceptance of the two-party system, and the evolution of institutions and methods for nominating and electing political officeholders were the most remarkable achievements of the period. The two-party structure has proved so durable that it has undergone relatively little change in the twentieth century; and the economic base the twentieth century inherited was so solid that the nation experienced two major wars, a couple of smaller ones and a horrible depression without significant political or social upheaval. Thus, enduring parties and a solid economic foundation were important legacies of the nineteenth-century political system to twentieth-century America.

The failures of the nation's political institutions in the nineteenth century were just as obvious. First, political leaders and Americans generally had a pervasive fear of government's power—a legacy of the Revolutionary era. Reform initiatives between the 1830's and the 1890's (except for those related to Reconstruction in the 1860's) reflected this distrust. The upshot was cautious, timid, reform movements designed to preserve existing institutions and power relationships or to restore an imagined but unrealistic view of the past.

Second, although nineteenth-century Americans accepted political diversity by acknowledging the validity of competing parties, they failed to accept cultural and ethnic diversity. This shortcoming was institutionalized in the nation's political structures, and by the end of the century it received constitutional sanction. Taken together, these failures meant that twentieth-century Americans would have to extend

rudimentary political democracy to a majority of the nation's citizens and create semblances of racial and economic democracy. But whether the accomplishments or the failures of the nineteenth century are being examined, the nation's governing institutions and political life were shaped by the reforms which resulted from the Revolutionary experience that culminated in the Constitution of 1787.

The Constitution created a system of government that was political from the top to the bottom; for the first time in world history the governed were closely identified with their government.

"No political conception was more important to Americans in the Revolutionary era than representation." Through the process of election, Americans determined who controlled their governing bodies. On the one hand, government remained an institution directed by rulers to deal with public issues. On the other hand, the people themselves elected their governors. Representation destroyed the age-long gulf between the government and the governed: in essence government became "the people themselves."<sup>1</sup>

Politicizing the system of government during the American Revolution formed "a watershed" in the nation's economic history. The country had inherited a market economy characterized by its agricultural and mercantile endeavors, but one which had not met the requisites for sustained growth and industrialization. Minimally, this required an internal transportation and communications network and an economic environment that created "a framework of reasonable expectations" in which entrepreneurs and aspiring capitalists could make "rational decisions . . . for the future." Both these prerequisites were well on the way to being satisfied by the end of the Jacksonian era. The nation's commercial policies invited foreign and domestic investors and encouraged technological innovations. The "transportation revolution" extended the scope of the market economy by transforming it from a regional to a national basis by 1860.<sup>2</sup>

Much of the credit for this rapidity in the nation's

<sup>1</sup> Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 164, 163.

<sup>2</sup> Stuart Bruchey, *The Roots of American Economic Growth, 1607-1861: An Essay in Social Causation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 72.



economic growth must be ascribed to the captains of industry, the promoters and the risk takers. Certainly it would have been impossible without them, but it is equally clear that the rate of development would have been cramped severely without government assistance from all levels of the federal system. Under direct popular control, governing institutions were sensitive to and consequently responsive to public pressures for economic aid.

By politicizing their government during the 1780's, the way had been cleared for the American people to shape their political institutions to promote economic growth. And during the nineteenth century, this is precisely what they did. By the century's end, the nation was a major industrial producer, and Americans could be rightfully proud of their economic achievements. In terms of real income, there was an average annual increase of 1.6 percent from 1840 on, which meant that "every 43 years, income per capita, in constant prices, had doubled in America . . . a very impressive annual growth rate."<sup>3</sup>

The development of political parties, the second major achievement of the nineteenth century, was achieved not so much because of, but in spite of, Revolutionary reforms. While the nation's material progress was based on an economic system carried over from the colonial era, its political structure represented a significant change in the adoption of competing parties. The Revolutionary generation feared political parties, the Founding Fathers deprecated their existence and Americans in the 1820's only accepted them reluctantly. Where economic development represented continuity, discontinuity was true in the evolution of parties.<sup>4</sup>

From the perspective of Americans living between the 1760's and the 1820's, political parties were identified with "conspiratorial juntas whose aim in the end could only be the overthrow of the existing government."<sup>5</sup> Opposition—the formation of parties, or factions as they were frequently termed—implied the growth of groups that were disloyal, perhaps even treasonous to the larger society.

The "first party system" died out during the Era of Good Feelings, but by the early 1820's it was

evident that political parties were again reemerging. And by the end of the 1820's, Americans accepted the emergence of permanent political parties. This was possible largely because neither the Democrats nor the Whigs were highly ideological parties in the sense of the Federalists or Republicans. The key issue in elections between 1832 and the mid-1840's was the presidential question: who would control the White House? Consequently, the primary thrust of the parties was organization, not issues.

Each party sought to build structures that would ensure the election of its presidential nominee, and up to the election of 1840 each used different techniques. The Democrats appealed to a broad mass of voters. For example, "One of the most striking features of [Jackson's bank] veto message . . . was its direct orientation to the electorate." In the message, Jackson spoke neither to the Congress which passed the bill nor to the Supreme Court that upheld the bank in the 1819 *McCulloch* decision;<sup>6</sup> "he spoke in plain language to voters." Jackson used his "kitchen cabinet" as a kind of early national committee. It became the core of a functional organization, designed to conduct campaigns and channel votes. The party organization saw to it that pamphlets and other electioneering items were spread throughout the country. The upshot was that "Some of the most important and innovative features in Jacksonian party organization were in the roles of its functionaries. It introduced new and lasting types of political leaders."<sup>6</sup> Subsequently, party leaders would be judged by their vote-getting abilities, not by their capacity for developing political philosophies.

The Whigs, on the other hand, followed the old Jeffersonian tradition of building a party by securing the support of established leaders. They assumed that the leaders would bring their local constituencies with them. They publicly eschewed direct popular appeal and enjoyed a remarkable success in winning support from local leaders, but they failed to win the offices they coveted until they changed their organization for the election of 1840. In campaigning for "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," the Whigs beat the Democrats at their own game. They made "revolutionary use of newspapers and of printed media of their own," appealing directly to the broad electorate in the best Jacksonian sense.<sup>7</sup>

Of the two organizing techniques, the Democratic system prevailed. The Whigs adopted it for the 1840 campaign. Party organizers and candidates have continued to operate with little change down to the present; both were and continue to be judged on their ability to secure votes.

## THE NOMINATING CONVENTION

The nominating convention became the primary method of selecting candidates during the 1820's and

\* *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

<sup>3</sup> Douglass C. North, *Growth and Welfare in the American Past* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

<sup>5</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Lynn L. Marshall, "The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig Party," *American Historical Review*, 77 (January, 1967), 449, 451.

<sup>7</sup> William N. Chambers, "Election of 1840," *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968*, ed. by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Fred L. Israel, 4 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 1: 767.

1830's, and has retained that function. The Whigs were the last holdouts. In the 1836 election, they offered several regional candidates, hoping to split the balloting so that Democratic nominee Martin Van Buren would not receive enough electoral votes for election. The election would then be thrown into the House of Representatives, as it had been in 1824, and, they presumed, a Whig would become the new President. The move backfired, and in 1840 they changed their strategy and used the nominating convention.<sup>8</sup>

Conventions provided a convenient method for parties to rally behind a single candidate and so mass their votes. They also conformed to the democratic theory that government should be responsive to popular dictates. Since parties followed the federal system of organizing, they were never controlled by strong central committees. Instead, they were state-centered and controlled by local leaders. A national convention was a federation of state delegates, "presumably chosen by the grass roots membership of the sponsoring party." Even in the late nineteenth century, when other segments of American life were being centralized, political parties and nominating conventions retained their original decentralized character.<sup>9</sup>

After nominating their candidates, parties had to conduct their campaigns. With the exception of Stephen A. Douglas in 1860 and William Jennings Bryan in 1896, the presidential nominees did not do any stumping. They remained at home, working discreetly behind the scenes while other candidates and party regulars did the campaign work.

The campaigns were not nearly so expensive as they became in the twentieth century, but they required financing nonetheless. Many of the financial burdens were underwritten either directly or indirectly by the government itself. The congressional frank was the most direct government assistance to campaigning, and members of Congress made extensive use of this privilege by sending political literature through the mails. Furthermore, the "spoils system" provided indirect government assistance to party treasuries. The spoils system had triumphed by the early Jacksonian era; "the alternation of party control had been basic in bringing it about."<sup>10</sup> Even after the 1883 Civil

Service Act, which was designed to minimize the impact of the system, it continued to have an important influence in party politics for the remainder of the century. Assessing government workers was a common method of raising money until it was outlawed by the 1883 Act, and even after 1883, high-ranking officers exempt from the Civil Service continued to be tapped for contributions. Since they shared the spoils of earlier victories, it was assumed they should help provide the means for future triumphs, especially because they might lose office if their party suffered defeat.

Newspapers were the most important means for reaching voters, and editors favoring the winning party might expect printing contracts. Until the creation of the Government Printing Office in 1860, these were generally offered to papers supporting the party in power. Campaign biographers could also expect favorable consideration if their candidate won. Thus, the spoils system provided a means for minimizing direct campaign costs by offering government workers and prospective employees inducements for direct campaign contributions and energetic work on behalf of their parties. Wealthy candidates and groups vitally interested in the election of particular parties also made significant contributions to campaigns. In the post-Civil War period, for example, the Republicans received considerable assistance from corporate enterprises. The most notable instance was the generous aid that William McKinley received from American businessmen in the election of 1896.<sup>11</sup>

A persistent problem of nineteenth century politics was the relationship between the political process and corrupt influences. Historians writing between the turn of the century and the end of the New Deal were impressed with corruption in the nineteenth-century American governing system. They contended that big business, which (by their definition) was evil, exerted an unhealthy influence over the nation's political life. There is little doubt that election irregularities existed and that some members of Congress had questionable relations with the American business community. Today, however, most historians have rejected the one-sided picture depicted so commonly 40 years ago, although they still note the corruption.

## ROLE OF THE VOTER

It is difficult to determine with a great degree of accuracy the role of the voter in the political life of the nineteenth century. The question of whether voters had a clear choice in nineteenth-century elections is apparently still open to debate. A curious development is that in "issueless" elections, voter turnout was extraordinarily high. In 1840, the year of the great democratic upsurge when 80 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots, the most memorable as-

<sup>8</sup> Joel H. Silbey, "Election of 1836," *History of American Presidential Elections*, 1: 577-600.

<sup>9</sup> Robert D. Marcus, *Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); James S. Chase, "Jacksonian Democracy and the Rise of the Nominating Convention," *Mid-America*, 45 (October, 1963), 229.

<sup>10</sup> Ari Hoogenboom, *Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> Herbert E. Alexander, "Financing Presidential Campaigns," *History of American Presidential Elections*, 4: 3869-97; Gilbert C. Fite, "Election of 1896," *ibid.*, 2: 1787-1825.

pects of the campaign were the slogans of the parties, not the issues. According to reputable historians, this same kind of discrepancy between insignificant party differences and high voter turnout was true of the Gilded Age. This raises a perplexing question: why, assuming there were elections with little or no differences between the parties, was voter turnout so heavy? Consider, for comparative purposes, the politics of the Progressive Era, where evidently there were more substantial issues, but lower voter participation in elections. Apparently, as the nation entered the twentieth century, one of the challenges to its political structure was voter apathy or, even worse, alienation from political activity.<sup>12</sup>

Certainly an unmistakable fact about political parties between the 1830's and the early 1850's was their national scope. There was no "solid South" in the antebellum period. Instead, "the South had a vigorous two-party system" with "keen political competition" between the Whigs and Democrats.<sup>13</sup> However, the second party system died during the mid-1850's. The opposing parties had difficulties enough coping with tariff and internal improvement issues and they "foundered completely when [they] could no longer ignore territorial expansion and slavery."<sup>14</sup> For practical purposes, the Whig party was dead by 1856, with former Whigs going into the Democratic party or the emerging Republican camp. By 1860, the Democrats had split, and for the rest of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the major parties had a sectional, not a national base. Between the end of reconstruction and the mid-1890's, neither party dominated American politics. They were in precarious balance until the 1896 election. William McKinley's victory over William Jennings Bryan signaled the triumph of the Republican party, which would remain the majority party until Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition was formed. As one scholar put it, there was a "big Republican monopoly in the North" and a "little Democratic monopoly in the South."<sup>15</sup>

### OBVIOUS SHORTCOMINGS

Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans were convinced that they controlled their government

<sup>12</sup> Chambers, "Election of 1840," *History of American Presidential Elections*, 1: 649. The elections between 1856 and 1876 offered voters definite choices about slavery in the territories, war and reconstruction.

<sup>13</sup> Charles G. Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" *American Historical Review*, 59 (January, 1954), 336, 337.

<sup>14</sup> Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 350.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

<sup>16</sup> Ida Tarbell, *Nationalizing of Business* (New York: Macmillan, 1937).

<sup>17</sup> Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Man: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 24.

and were proud of their unique political institutions. This pride was based on substantial achievements, but in spite of the American political genius, obvious shortcomings and ugly blemishes tarnished the picture.

Americans had a particular knack for using government to spark economic development in the first half of the nineteenth century. They continued to demonstrate this talent in the second half, but by the 1870's, a growing number became concerned about the social implications of economic concentration. In the two generations after Appomattox, the nation experienced the impact of "a new national economic order."<sup>16</sup> The older, local and regional economy of the prewar decades gave way to centralized control in industry after industry. Corporate consolidation was exemplified by Western Union's domination of telegraphing in the summer of 1866. By century's end, major aspects of the economy had been "trustified."

The new economic order directly challenged traditional values. Pre-Civil War Americans had not concerned themselves with the redistribution of wealth. They thought they were creating a society that opened the avenues of social and economic advancement to all members of society. One of their basic values was that "the interests of labor and capital were identical, because equality of opportunity . . . generated a social mobility which assured that today's laborer would be tomorrow's capitalist." If a man could not rise above the position of the wage earner, it was regarded not as a fault of the system, but as proof of improvidence or folly. "Poverty, or even the failure to advance economically, were thus individual, not social failures, the consequence of poor personal habits. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

However, the growth of centralized economic institutions gave the lie to this social philosophy. Ironically, the corporation, which seemed to offer promise of economic democracy before 1860, threatened that democracy. In the context of the market economy, the corporation seemed to promise economic democracy as the material complement to the political democracy Americans enjoyed as a result of the Revolution. But as corporations evolved into monopolies, this hope faded.

Wealth became concentrated, and the interests of labor and capital were no longer identical. The earlier hope of a social mobility based on merit and hard work remained only an ideal. Little wonder, then, that by the end of the century the Populists insisted that the system itself was out of joint. Instead of being free individuals, workers were debased, becoming cogs in production—an expedient for corporate enterprise. Because of corporate activity, many Americans came to the conclusion that poverty and even the failure to advance socially and economically were social, not personal failures. No matter what their benefits, corporations produced bitter fruit.

The political implications of concentrated wealth



## IMPEACHMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The impeachment and removal of governing personnel is an aspect of the American system of government which at first glance might not seem to be political. However, impeachment is essentially a political method which permits flexibility in what is otherwise a process governed by rigid timetables. Members of the Supreme Court serve for life or good behavior. Removal comes either from retirement or death. Presidents serve four-year tenures that are predetermined by the Constitution. Independent of the ordinary political process, impeachment permits the American government to circumvent constitutionally these rigid time constraints.

In March, 1804, the House of Representatives brought a bill of impeachment against Samuel Chase, a justice of the Supreme Court. House Republicans thought that Chase had been overly zealous in prosecuting Republicans under the 1798 Sedition Act, a law adopted by a Federalist Congress and President to restrain Republican political activity. They were further convinced that Chase's electioneering for John Adams in 1800 and his attacks on Jeffersonians were politically excessive. "No infraction of the law was alleged"; he was charged simply with political offenses.<sup>1</sup> Since the timetable governing the tenure of justices on the Court did not permit his removal through normal methods, the Republicans tried to remove him through the political alternative of impeachment. However, the Senate refused to convict Chase, falling four votes shy of the required two-thirds majority.<sup>2</sup>

The second case, involving President Andrew Johnson in the early post-Civil War period, had even stronger political implications. Reconstruction was the most critical political issue in Johnson's administration. Johnson adamantly insisted that a minimal program—restoration—was the prerequisite for reuniting the Union, which had been torn by four years of bitter war. Members of Congress, on the other hand, were convinced that major changes—reconstruction—were necessary. Johnson's policy, they feared, jeopardized the victory of the Union. In the period immediately following the war, Johnson apparently condoned Black Codes and gave official recognition to leading rebels who, only a few months earlier, had been shooting Union soldiers. Johnson's

"policy" provoked Congress into writing its own reconstruction program.

Congress premised its policy on the need for a loyal South. This meant a political alliance between former bondsmen and southern Unionists. Simultaneously, leading confederates would be disfranchised. Hopefully, through the Freedman's Bureau and the adoption of civil rights legislation, former slaves would become free, independent citizens, integrated into the American political process. Essentially, congressional reconstruction was conservative. Congress hoped to reunite the nation by extending to black Americans the same freedoms and rights whites had enjoyed since Independence. The defects of the Union would be corrected by opening the political process to four million individuals who had formerly been excluded. The nation's security would be underwritten by putting the government of the southern states under the control of loyalists.<sup>3</sup>

Johnson vetoed the reconstruction measures, which was his right. But Congress repeatedly overrode his vetoes, and congressional will thus became law. Time and again, however, Johnson refused to enforce the law, which was his duty as the nation's chief executive officer. In addition, he urged his subordinates in the executive branch to follow his example. Congress responded by limiting Johnson's authority over his officers. On February 21, 1868, Johnson dismissed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in defiance of the Tenure of Office Act (1867). The next day, the House of Representatives voted 126 to 47 to impeach the President for not obeying the act. In May, 1868, in two separate sessions, the Senate voted 35 to 19 to convict him. This was one vote short of the two-thirds vote needed for a conviction. Thus Johnson was not convicted.<sup>4</sup>

Like the Chase impeachment, the case against Johnson was political. Reconstruction had been a controversial political matter since Sumter. But even if the Chase or Johnson impeachments had not involved pressing political issues, impeachment itself remains a political process. The charges are brought by the House, a political body, against officials of the executive or judicial branches, persons who obtain their offices either directly or indirectly by political means. Finally, the verdict is given by the Senate, another political body.

Although impeachment provided an alternative to the usual method of removing governing officials, it was cumbersome at best, and was seldom put to use. As a political tool for removing governing officials, impeachment had little impact and none after 1868, until 1974.

Lester G. Lindley

<sup>1</sup> Alfred A. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, *The American Constitution*, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 234.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 232-236.

<sup>3</sup> Eric L. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

<sup>4</sup> Michael Les Benedict, *The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York: Norton, 1972).

were equally foreboding. Ever since the Revolutionary period, Americans had a deep, ingrained suspicion of uncontrolled power. To offset the evils of a centralized political structure, they had created a federal system of government. Power was fragmented between two governing levels—the nation and the states—and each level was further limited in exercising its powers by an elaborate system of checks and balances among the three branches.

In the period between Independence and the end of the Civil War, the governing system resulting from the reforms of the 1780's was evenly balanced by acceptable economic organization. A decentralized government was ideal in a decentralized economy. However, monopolies upset the balance. Instead of political power (which the Revolutionary generation had feared) the culprit for post-Civil War Americans was concentrated economic power, with inadequate governing control. In itself, this need not have been a handicap; Americans could have used the national government to effect social control over the economy had they chosen to do so. Instead, they had practically the same distrust of government their revolutionary predecessors had, as if government were still controlled by George III and his capricious ministers. The accent was on what government should not do; consequently, "the veto was the most significant Presidential power, the test of the truly moral man."<sup>18</sup>

### NINETEENTH-CENTURY REFORM

This negativism was exemplified in reform movements of the late nineteenth century. The past, not the uncertain present or ominous future, was the model for reform. The imperative was "moral rejuvenation"; personal, individual change, not institutional adjustment.<sup>19</sup> Reformed individuals would mean a transformed society. Governmental responses were not crucial in this scheme. Even as late as 1896, the Democratic party based its campaign, in large, on restoring an America that was fading rapidly. Generally, "cries for reform" in the Gilded Age "sounded much like the counsel of reaction."<sup>20</sup>

The failure to effect social control over corporate enterprise was even more striking when government did respond to the need for regulation. By the late 1880's, Congress acknowledged the need for national controls over the economy by adopting the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act and the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act. However, the extent of "regulation" under

these measures raised pointed questions. There is good evidence that the very industry to be regulated—railroads—initiated and supported the 1887 legislation. It is clear that once the Interstate Commerce Commission was established it was dominated by railroad men. Whether it was the railroad industry in the 1890's or the oil industry in the 1970's, government has consistently staffed its commissions with men from the industry that it seeks to regulate. Likewise, it has drawn on information from the same sources to use in formulating regulatory policies. Political institutions have been used as much to benefit major economic institutions as to regulate them in the public interest.

### A CONSERVATIVE JUDICIARY

Even when Congress or state assemblies acted to regulate corporate enterprise in the public's behalf, the third branch of government—the judiciary—imposed severe limitations on government's powers, effectively placing corporations beyond the control of government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Between the late 1880's and the 1920's, with the exception of Woodrow Wilson, Presidents deliberately appointed men to the Supreme Court who were highly solicitous of private property. By 1890, the Court had accepted the notion that government was obligated to protect property rights. Convinced that property was under a concerted attack by socialists, Populists, anarchists and other un-American malcontents, it took upon itself the task of protecting it. This attitude was reflected in its decisions from the mid-1890's through the middle of the 1930's—for half a century the Court effectively nullified congressional and state economic regulatory measures.<sup>21</sup>

In the 50 years preceding the New Deal, the Court enjoyed as much (if not more) political success in attaining its political objectives as either the legislative or executive branches. But in the process it frustrated the obvious need for economic reforms and thus must bear partial responsibility for the chaos of the Great Depression. The highly politicized governing structure of the nineteenth century exercised inadequate social control over the economy.

The second major failing of nineteenth-century government was its inability to accept ethnic and cultural pluralism. Political diversity was premised on the idea of social and economic differences, but it was a diversity for whites only, for the most part for white Protestants. Roman Catholics were accepted grudgingly at best; red and black men and white

(Continued on page 38)

<sup>18</sup> Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), p. 36.

<sup>19</sup> John G. Sproat, *"The Best Men": Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Wiebe, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred Harbison, *The American Constitution*, 4th ed. (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 500-757.

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*"For many groups in society, the Progressive Era had meant little. The plight of blacks, the rural poor, and the unorganized urban worker remained desperate. . . . The major innovations of the period—regulatory agencies, election reforms, structural alterations—did not banish injustice from the nation. They did, however, mitigate the effects of an industrial society on many citizens."*

## Popular Government and Political Reform: 1890-1920

BY LEWIS L. GOULD

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AT THE BEGINNING of the twentieth century, dissatisfaction with the condition of national politics affected many thoughtful observers of American society. Their indictments have a familiar ring. Some feared the impact of corporate power and cash on the institutions of government. Others complained that political parties responded inadequately to popular needs and were too close to the dominant economic forces of the nation. From various sectors arose a clamor for change that historians have called, using the term that reform-minded citizens applied to their efforts, "Progressivism."

It would be simple to conclude, as some scholars have, that political reform in the two decades after 1900 was a direct ancestor of the forces for innovation that swirl through contemporary America. To a degree it was. But there were also significant divergences of approach and substance that separate Theodore Roosevelt from John Gardner, Lincoln Steffens from Jack Anderson. Current politics owes much that is good and some things that are dubious to the Progressive Era, and a review of the issues and personalities of that turbulent period can provide a firmer basis for analyzing the weaknesses and strengths of modern American public life.

An evaluation of the Progressive Era must first recognize that late nineteenth century politics differed

markedly from the accepted picture of a dull, tawdry, and issueless combat between torpid and leaderless Republicans and Democrats. Important ideological disagreements divided the major parties in the 1890's as they struggled to break the electoral stalemate that had existed since the presidential election of 1876. If either organization had an advantage as the decade began it was the Democratic party. Though the Democrats had won the presidency only once since 1860, they had a solid bloc of electoral votes in the South and a general strength across much of the country outside New England. Under the leadership of Grover Cleveland in 1884, the Democrats appealed to voters with a mixture of states rights, racism, and opposition to attempts to use the power of the national government to promote economic growth.<sup>1</sup>

From the Civil War to 1885, Republicans had controlled the White House, but only by narrow margins after 1876. Asserting doctrines of nationalism and active governmental intervention to spur the expansion of the economy, the Republicans saw their popular base erode in the congressional elections of 1890 and the presidential contest of 1892, when Cleveland was elected for a second term. In view of the tepid voter response to Republican policies of tariff protection, costly government, and religious moralism in local politics in the Middle West, Woodrow Wilson could persuasively argue (as Grover Cleveland began his second term as President in March, 1893) that "the Republican party is going, or at any rate may presently go, to pieces."<sup>2</sup>

Yet forces of social protest and economic distress after 1893 thwarted Democratic hopes of dominance and ended 20 years of political deadlock. Farmers from the South and West used the Populist party in

<sup>1</sup> R. Hal Williams, "Dry Bones and Dead Language: The Democratic Party," in H. Wayne Morgan, ed., *The Gilded Age*, rev. ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970), pp. 129-134.

<sup>2</sup> Woodrow Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Harper Bros., 1925), 1: 204; Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 122-173.



those years as a vehicle for their anger against low crop prices, a growing burden of debt, and the failure of the major parties to respond to their grievances. Populism's largest effect came before 1896 as it exposed genuine social inequities in rural America and compelled the agrarian wing of the Democrats to endorse such solutions as the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Narrowly concentrated on sectional problems of staple agriculture and more conservative in practice than sympathetic historians have admitted, the Populists established a context of protest conducive to the more diverse Progressive impulse that soon supplanted Populism.<sup>3</sup>

The Republicans were the important political beneficiaries of the depression of the 1890's. Hard times and Grover Cleveland's inept leadership had left the Democrats in a shambles by the time of congressional races of 1894. Sweeping Republican victories in that year resulted in the largest turnover of House seats from one party to the other in the nation's history. Offered a choice among the discredited policies of Cleveland's party, the agrarian proposals of the Populists, and Republican doctrines that emphasized pluralism and economic prosperity, voters endorsed "the party of energy and change." Two years later, William McKinley's victory over William Jennings Bryan gave the Republicans the presidency and solidified their hold on the allegiance of a majority of the electorate. Unlike the legends that have depicted him as weak and indecisive, McKinley was an adroit and shrewd political leader who strengthened the presidential office and was the central figure in Republican success between 1894 and 1901.<sup>4</sup>

Beneath the surface of these national political upheavals, a new spirit of reform emerged in the mid-1890's in response to the unrest released by economic misery and the profound social forces of industrialization and urbanization that had intensified since the Civil War. Fearful of more drastic changes in the absence of gradual improvement, aware of the na-

tional and international growth of socialism, concerned Americans listened more attentively to the proponents of moderate innovation. In many colleges and universities, students in comfortable circumstances heard their instructors reject hallowed precepts against government interference with society and learned for the first time the extent of poverty, squalor, and injustice in America. The Social Gospel won converts among clergymen and religious citizens who took their church to the community through the settlement house or mission. Yet, of all the groups that composed the early Progressive coalition, the most important were the residents of cities like Chicago and Milwaukee who banded together to protest inadequate public services, unjust taxation, or corruption in urban government. Such local efforts to curb corporate favoritism and readjust the balance of power provided the foundation for reform in the cities and states after 1900.

The emerging Progressive impulse drew on other sources of support as the 1890's closed. When Americans argued about the impact on national values of the overseas expansion that came out of the Spanish-American war, they were prompted to reappraise society's performance in other areas. In the expanding arena of national magazines, citizens read the work of reporters and social critics as they exposed scandal and wrongdoing, building an audience for reform. After the intense political struggles of the first half of the decade, voters found the older forms of party warfare enervating, and they agreed with those who believed better government would follow a reduction in partisanship. Most important, the middle class noted the rapid growth of trusts and large corporations, and worried about the consequences of these developments on the economic opportunity of the smaller businessman and entrepreneur.<sup>5</sup>

Not all the manifestations of Progressive discontent, however, corresponded with what would be deemed socially desirable today. Some reformers in the cities disliked the way urban political machines used the votes of immigrants and ethnic groups as a power base; accordingly, their calls for change had an ethnocultural and class dimension. Prohibition, immigration restriction, and racial proscription were ways that some Progressives, North and South, sought to reaffirm older values and to reassert a common purpose in the face of an industrializing and urbanizing social order. Many reformers pursued change at the expense of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and other national groups; most simply left minorities off the Progressive agenda. The rhetoric of reform also clothed the efforts of business groups in the South, Far West, and agrarian Middle West to realign economic forces to the disadvantage of the East in favor of their region or section.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> K. D. Bicha, "The Conservative Populists: A Hypothesis," *Agricultural History*, 47 (January, 1973), 9-24.

<sup>4</sup> Lewis L. Gould, "The Republican Search for a National Majority," in Morgan, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 182-187. For a description of Democratic difficulties in one key state, see R. Hal Williams, *The Democratic Party and California Politics, 1880-1896* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

<sup>5</sup> Stanley P. Caine, "The Origins of Progressivism," in Lewis L. Gould, ed., *The Progressive Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1974), pp. 11-34; David P. Thelen, *The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885-1900* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972).

<sup>6</sup> Richard M. Abrams, "The Failure of Progressivism," in Richard M. Abrams and Lawrence Levine, eds., *The Shaping of Twentieth Century America: Interpretive Essays* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 213-218; Otis L. Graham, Jr., *The Great Campaigns: Reform and War in America, 1900-1928* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 144-152, 154-159.

For two decades after 1900, those who styled themselves Progressives had a significant influence on the quality and direction of American politics. Their contribution in defining the major social issues and priorities of the period was constructive and important. Reformers raised questions about the expanding power of the corporation and its effect on public life, and impelled society to confront the problem of the proper relation of government to business. Muckrakers revealed the hazards of unsafe consumer products, exposed the cozy relationships between large economic interests and some politicians, and brought to light the deplorable condition of the poor, the laboring child and woman, and the unprotected industrial worker. Conservationists criticized the disorderly exploitation of natural resources and warned of the consequences of heedless use. Finally, urban reformers focused attention on the ills of the city, stressing pervasive corruption, substandard housing, and insufficient services. To all these concerns, Progressives brought a belief in human progress, optimism about the future of society, and a deep moralistic fervor.<sup>7</sup>

To deal with the problems they had analyzed, reform-minded Americans followed two broad and often contradictory lines of policy. They sought, as they told each other, a government at once more effective and more democratic. Achieving greater efficiency required alterations in the structures and procedures of government to overcome or reduce the conditions of disorder associated with public life in the Gilded Age. The Progressive Era valued rationality, efficiency, and the apparent orderliness of science, and its reformers sought to make these qualities operate in the nation's public affairs.

For the nation's towns and cities, proposals for the commission and city manager forms of government identified the election of aldermen from geographically or ethnically defined districts as a source of corruption and waste. Commission government, begun in Galveston, Texas, in 1900, and refined in Des Moines, Iowa, after 1907, abandoned aldermen and substituted officials with specific responsibilities for

police, fire protection, and housing and public utilities and, in theory, with a broader concept of the interest of the city as a whole. By the time of the First World War, the city manager form of urban government was replacing the commission variety because of its superior claims to nonpartisanship and effectiveness. Both plans, however, stressed the same themes—a reduction of political considerations in making decisions, the importance of efficiency, and the merits of “business” methods in running the city.<sup>8</sup>

The desire to regulate the business community on the basis of expertise and nonpartisanship produced similar structural reform impulses on the state and national level. The regulatory agency became the Progressive Era's most characteristic institutional response to the problem of managing an industrial society. Members of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission or the Federal Trade Commission, experts on the industry they were to oversee, could make decisions about economic policy without having to defer to partisan pressures. They would be able to locate and promote “the public interest” with a degree of certainty that no politician could equal.<sup>9</sup>

These proposals for structural change were laudable in the abstract but scholars have raised questions about their real purpose and practical application. Urban reform that diminished the power of representatives from an individual ward often deprived an ethnic or economic minority of political influence and shifted power to a different segment of the business community. Some American cities are now engaged in dismantling Progressive structures in response to charges that the local interests of minorities have suffered at the hands of a city government that identified “the public interest” with the welfare of the dominant economic or racial group. Similarly, the regulatory agency has come under fire as a device through which the corporations transformed expert regulators into expert instruments. In their concern with institutional change, the Progressives did not sufficiently appreciate that their structural proposals could produce conservative results in the hands of men unsympathetic to reform.<sup>10</sup>

Structural changes were not, however, the entire progressive story. The reformers believed that the conduct of politics would improve when provision for more citizen action occurred, and a variety of measures looked toward that goal. All of them reflected a distrust of political parties and were an effort to restrict the power of such formal organizations. To enable voters to suggest legislative remedies and to prod lawmakers into action, the initiative supplied a procedure through which the electorate could propose laws. When an issue became disputed, the referendum allowed for an expression of public opinion at the ballot box. Adopted first in the Far West, these measures gained increasing acceptance in the East

<sup>7</sup> Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–51, provides a useful summary of what the progressives did.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Hays, “The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,” *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 55 (October, 1964), 157–169; Melvin G. Holli, “Urban Reform in the Progressive Era,” in Gould, *The Progressive Era*, pp. 133–153; Bradley R. Rice, “The Galveston Plan: Birth of a Progressive Idea,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, forthcoming.

<sup>9</sup> Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 38–50; Stanley P. Caine, *The Myth of a Progressive Reform: Railroad Regulation in Wisconsin, 1903–1910* (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970).

<sup>10</sup> For an evaluation of the effects of these reforms, see Thomas K. McCraw, “The Progressive Legacy,” in Gould, *The Progressive Era*, pp. 183–185, 187–190.

and South before their popularity waned around 1915.<sup>11</sup>

More controversial was the provision for the recall of elected officials and state judicial decisions. Recall sought to give citizens the power to reverse unpopular court rulings or to remove officers who failed in their trust but who were otherwise insulated from assault. Because it struck at judges and the courts—the bastions of conservative protection against the forces of democracy—the recall aroused the most intense passions of these three suggested reforms. When Theodore Roosevelt endorsed the recall of judicial decisions in 1912, he severely wounded his presidential hopes among moderate and conservative Republicans. The recall was, in any event, more discussed than adopted. Provisions for the recall of public officials were enacted in ten states between 1908 and 1915; recall of judicial decisions was confined to a single eight-year experiment in Colorado after 1913.<sup>12</sup>

The direct primary, the direct election of senators, and woman suffrage were more significant manifestations of the Progressive Era's effort to give the majority of voters "an easy, direct and certain control over their government." Pressure for primary elections to select candidates grew out of the power that party regulars exercised over nominating conventions and caucuses. To offset the advantages of their entrenched rivals, reformers like Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin championed primaries as a way the people could select honest men to run for office. "Abolish the caucus and the convention," La Follette concluded in 1897. "Go back to the first principles of democracy; go back to the people."<sup>13</sup> Primaries first appeared in Southern states around the turn of the century, and spread across the nation in the next decade and a half.

The direct election of United States Senators gained adherents in the first decade of the nineteenth century as Americans read of corruption and deadlock in the state legislatures that still selected the membership of

the upper house of Congress. The Senate's place as the stronghold of conservatism, symbolized by its Republican leader, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, further intensified pressures to remove this crucial electoral decision from the hands of weak or purchasable state legislators. Such a reform would be, said Senator Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas, a leader in the struggle, "the most effective means of taking from organized wealth the control of the Senate, and indeed of our national politics." The work of Bristow, William E. Borah, and other Progressives guided the Seventeenth Amendment through the Congress in May, 1912, and 36 states ratified it within the next year.<sup>14</sup>

The drive for woman suffrage spanned the whole period of Progressive reform. Basically middle class in its membership and views, the suffrage campaign argued that votes for women would purify politics and bring a new moral force into public life. At the same time, the advocates of woman suffrage often stressed that female ballots could offset the votes of blacks and immigrants, perceived as sources of corruption, and suffragists frequently linked their cause with the ethnocultural goals of the forces of prohibition. Through the labors of an organization like the National American Woman Suffrage Association, voting by women spread out from its base in the Far West in the 1890's to other western states by 1914 and into the South and East during World War I. Ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 put woman suffrage in the Constitution, beyond the reach of masculine tinkering, and completed the movement's national work.<sup>15</sup>

Democratic in purpose and theory, these reforms had ambiguous and flawed results. When Progressives spoke of enhancing the power of the "people," they often defined the "people" as Americans like themselves. As a result, the instruments of popular participation were not extended to the lower classes or the economically deprived. Laws to regulate elections reduced the size of the electorate and eroded the power of the political party; the direct primary did not bring a greater voter turnout; instead, it shifted power toward candidates with incumbent status or the money to sway a contest. Devices like the initiative and referendum have proved blunt instruments for expressing the popular will. They can assault minority rights or pose complex issues in a deceptively simple way, and are ideologically neutral and not necessarily mechanisms for reform. Even woman suffrage did not produce the heralded improvement in the quality of local and national politics.

After 1900, these national pressures for political change affected the Republicans first. For more than a decade, under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, the party debated its position on the role of government in an industrial society. Republican Progressives like Roosevelt,

<sup>11</sup> Jonathan Bourne, Jr., "Initiative, Referendum, and Recall," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 109 (January, 1912), 122-129, offers a favorable, contemporary assessment.

<sup>12</sup> Edwin Maxey, "The Recall of the Judges," *Forum*, 48 (September, 1912), 294-308, gives a sense of the feelings that the recall aroused among its opponents.

<sup>13</sup> Benjamin Parke DeWitt, *The Progressive Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968, reprint of 1915 edition), p. 196; Robert M. La Follette, *La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences* (Madison: The Robert M. La Follette Co., 1913), p. 197; Arthur Wallace Dunn, "The Direct Primary: Promise and Performance," *The American Review of Reviews*, 46 (October, 1912), 439-445.

<sup>14</sup> Larry Joe Easterling, "Senator Joseph L. Bristow and the Seventeenth Amendment," (M.A. report, University of Texas at Austin, 1973), pp. 29-30, and *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 1-13, 249-264.



Robert M. La Follette, and Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana advocated a program of moderate innovation that included broadened federal power, vigorous presidential action, and a wide array of reform measures to curb corporations and achieve social justice. Republican conservatives regarded such policies as a threat to their vested interests and an unwise extension of national authority over the rights of private property. In a steadily worsening series of intra-party squabbles the conservatives established an ascendancy by the time of the Taft-Roosevelt split in 1912.

The political leadership of Theodore Roosevelt was a central element in the division within the Republican party. Recent skepticism about the merits of the strong presidency has prompted reappraisals of the long-standing favorable verdict on Roosevelt's years in the White House. His assertion of executive power, praised in the case of the Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902, seems less salutary in light of the miscarriages of justice toward black soldiers that grew out of the Brownsville incident of 1906. Theodore Roosevelt was a master of the techniques and artistry of electoral politics; he was less successful in the equally demanding and subtle craft of persuading fellow politicians to do what he wanted them to do.

In his first term, succeeding William McKinley, Roosevelt played down departures in public policy and concentrated on securing the Republican presidential nomination and election in 1904 "in his own right." He adhered to the broad lines of McKinley's program in substance, but injected a moralistic thrust and flamboyant excitement into the political wars against opposition in his party and against the divided Democrats. Increased rancor and ideological discord characterized the Republicans in Roosevelt's second term. Roosevelt's support for the Hepburn Act (1906) to regulate railroads, as well as his endorsement of pure food and meat inspection legislation, helped limit Democratic gains in the election of 1906, and demonstrated a positive Republican response to public clamor against social ills. Roosevelt's leftward shift after 1907 split the Republicans into distinct and bitter factions, and his relations with Congress ran rapidly downhill in quarrels over Brownsville, conservation, and innumerable other issues. But Roosevelt's biggest miscalculation was his insistence that William Howard Taft be his successor in 1908.

Taft's four years as President were unhappy for the man and disastrous for his party. Blunders over the

tariff, conservation, and patronage, combined with the rising cost of living, ended Republican control of the House of Representatives in 1910. More important, President Taft and Roosevelt drew apart over questions of policy and personality until little remained of their once warm friendship. A former judge who distrusted reformers, Taft gravitated naturally to a more conservative posture, while Roosevelt, out of conviction and calculation, became more Progressive. In late 1911, the former President decided, because of anger at Taft, to seek the Republican nomination in 1912. Roosevelt ran as the Progressive champion, but in his decision personal considerations played as large a role as reform goals. He was tired of private life, and craved power. A bitter and protracted contest ended with Roosevelt's bolt from the national convention in June, 1912, amid claims of fraud and deceit.

Neither Taft, running as the Republican candidate, nor Roosevelt, as the Progressive party nominee, won in 1912, but the Republican party was the biggest loser. The long-range result was a confirmation of the conservative dominance in the party. When he left, Roosevelt took with him much of the constructive energy, the appeal to a broad spectrum of American society, and the responsible programs that had animated the Republicans before 1912. Roosevelt returned to his political home in 1916, but his party never quite regained what it had lost in the disaster of 1912.<sup>16</sup>

Republican division was Democratic opportunity. In the 15 years after 1894, the Democrats labored to overcome the handicaps of Cleveland's presidency, the popular memories of the 1890's, and the leadership of Bryan. Still basically wedded to states rights and its negativist stance, the Democratic party showed some signs of rejuvenation in the elections of 1906 and 1908. Winning the House in 1910 took the Democrats to the limits of the strength to be gained from Republican discord. The party's problem as 1912 approached was to find a candidate who could seize this rare chance and win the White House.

Woodrow Wilson solved the Democratic problem and secured for his party an eight-year lease on the presidency. Rising swiftly from Princeton University through the governorship of New Jersey, Wilson de-

(Continued on page 36)

<sup>16</sup> For contrasting views of the Republicans in this period, see Horace Samuel Merrill and Marion Galbraith Merrill, *The Republican Command, 1897-1913* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971); and Lewis L. Gould "The Republicans Under Roosevelt and Taft," in Gould, *The Progressive Era*, pp. 55-82.

Lewis L. Gould is the author of *Wyoming: A Political History, 1868-1896* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and *Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973). He has edited and contributed articles to *The Progressive Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1974), and is working on a history of the Republican party from 1897 to 1913.

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*"It is never clear to what extent issues influence an election and what part personality plays; how much both these considerations give way to historical or other forces can hardly be measured."*

## Politics in Mid-Twentieth Century America

BY JAMES A. HUSTON  
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WOODROW WILSON sought to make of the election of 1920 a "great and solemn referendum" on the League of Nations. Repudiated by political leaders of the opposition in the Senate, he would appeal over their heads to the people.

Historians and political observers have long contended that the "great referendum" never took place. Blurred by the equivocation of Warren G. Harding and his supporters, the issue of the League never came into focus. Harding appealed to isolationists by repudiating Mr. Wilson's League while favoring some vague "general association of nations" which the United States might join. Thirty-one distinguished Republican leaders, including Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes, who favored the League, issued a statement to the effect that the best way to assure American participation in the League was to vote for Harding.

On the other hand, even the Democratic platform conceded the need for clarifying reservations in the ratification of the League of Nations Covenant, although the nominees—Governor James M. Cox of Ohio and Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, young and popular Assistant Secretary of the Navy—labored manfully to make of the election the referendum which Wilson wanted.

It may be argued that Wilson's earlier appeal over the heads of his political opponents in his swing across the country in 1919 might have been successful had his health not collapsed. It may be argued, as James E. Watson, one of the Republican leaders in the Senate in support of Henry Cabot Lodge's fight against the treaty, conceded, that most Americans at that time were in favor of the treaty. But that opinion did not solidify. Wilson was not able—for whatever reason—to rouse the country to his side. And the only voice of the people that could be heard sought retreat from the world stage.

Indeed, there was a "great and solemn referendum" in 1920, and it spoke out "loud and clear" in favor of isolation. It spoke with such force that no one dared again to advocate the League of Nations with any enthusiasm. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, the great advocate of Wilson and champion of the League in 1920, muted these sentiments in the 1930's when he had the greatest base of political support in recent history. Warren G. Harding, in his first message to Congress, announced that the United States would have nothing to do with the League of Nations, and a little later he pronounced the issue "as dead as slavery."

"Big Bill" Thompson captured the spirit of the times when he ran for mayor of Chicago in 1926 on a platform which had little to say about municipal services, crime in the streets, or the park system but which comprised three main points: "America first, no World Court, and biff King George in the nose."

One major trend indicated by the elections of the 1920's was a turning away from internationalism; another was a trend away from reform. Although Eugene V. Debs could poll 920,000 votes as a Socialist, running from an Atlanta prison cell in 1920, and Robert M. La Follette could win 4,800,000 votes with a revived Progressive party in 1924, these efforts were lost in the inundation of Republican, pro-business votes.

It is never clear to what extent issues influence an election and what part personality plays; and how much both these considerations give way to historical or other forces can hardly be measured. But several historical indicators, which had become established in the nineteenth century, continued to apply in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's.

### HISTORICAL INDICATORS

The first of these was the fact that whichever party won control of the House of Representatives in an

off-year election won the presidency two years later. There was no exception to this rule from 1890 through 1944, although it took a split in the Republican party in 1912 to bring about the result predicted by the Democratic victory of 1910. And in the 1930's, it took the intervention of providence to give the Democrats control of the House after the deaths of seven Republican congressmen-elect eliminated what would have been a Republican majority; the new House correctly pointed to a Democratic victory in 1932.

Another rule of presidential politics was geographical: after 1844, the Democrats were successful only with candidates from the East, while the Republicans were successful only with candidates from the West (the political west being anything west of Pennsylvania). The only exceptions to this rule were cases when a Vice President succeeded to the presidency and then ran as an incumbent. This, of course, was the obverse of the rule about Presidents, because generally candidates for Vice President have been chosen from a section of the country different from the section of the candidate for President.

Perhaps most important of all was the historical rule that a party tended to hold its accumulated popular vote total, so that a party could not expect to win a national election unless it polled more votes than its rival had polled in the preceding election.

One further observation which might have been expected to have some applicability in the 1920's was this: A war nearly always brings forth one or more military leaders to the presidency. As the election of 1920 approached, the Republicans appeared to have some distinct advantages. They had captured control of Congress in the election of 1918, and this portended victory in 1920. The closeness of the vote in 1916 gave the Democrats no substantial advantage in the accumulated popular vote. If the Republicans could come up with an attractive candidate (preferably one from the West) they stood a good chance to return to power.

### THE NOMINATIONS OF 1920

One might have expected that Charles Evans Hughes, having run such a close race in 1916 and holding the respect of all parties, would have been the logical choice for the Republican nomination in 1920. But he refused. Even though he was still willing to give his life to public service, he was not willing to go through another presidential race. If his health had remained good, Theodore Roosevelt surely would have been a willing candidate. When he died in January, 1919, he still was as young (60) as Wilson had been in 1916. Another possibility was Herbert Hoover. He had won great popularity as director of relief for Belgium, and then as director of the United States Food Administration. Perhaps

more than anyone else, Hoover filled the role of war hero. But until close to convention time, no one was sure whether he was a Republican or Democrat. Although earlier he had announced that he would have to "vote for the party that stands for the League," Hoover found that he was a Republican after all, and he indicated that he would be receptive to the nomination.

As the time for the Republican national convention in Chicago approached, two strong contenders and a host of favorite sons appeared. General Leonard Wood was a strong contender. His reputation grew mainly out of his service in Cuba and his service in the training camps during World War I. He had been a close associate of Theodore Roosevelt, and when Wilson denied him a European command during the war, this added to his anti-Wilson credentials. His chief rival was Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois. Lowden was so popular that even some Southern Democrats who had voted a straight Democratic ticket all their lives said that if Lowden were nominated they would vote for him. Wood and Lowden, then, were the chief contenders, but enough other candidates, including Hoover, Harding, Hiram Johnson of California, and Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, remained in the field to place Wood and Lowden in a deadlock.

Although Harding had conducted something of a pre-convention campaign, it had been disappointing. In the three presidential primaries which he entered, he won his home state by only 15,000 votes; in neighboring Indiana he won no delegates at all; and he polled only 723 votes out of 40,000 in Montana.

The dominant figures in the convention were Henry Cabot Lodge, who served as chairman of the convention, Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania, Will H. Hays, the national chairman, and George Harvey, one of Wilson's early supporters who had turned against him bitterly during the war. Henry Sinclair and Edward L. Doheny rounded out the group of business leaders who more or less controlled the convention. Harry M. Daugherty, Harding's campaign manager, was not daunted by his candidate's poor showing. As he put it to newspaper reporters:

I don't expect Senator Harding to be nominated on the first, second, or third ballots, but I think we can afford to take chances that, about eleven minutes after two, Friday morning of the convention, when ten or twenty weary men are sitting around a table, someone will say, "Who will we nominate?" At that decisive time the friends of Harding will suggest him and can well afford to abide by the result.

Senator Lodge set the bitter anti-Wilson mood of the convention in his keynote speech when he said:

Mr. Wilson and his dynasty, his heirs and assigns, or anybody that is his, anybody who with bent knee has served his purpose, must be driven from all control of government and all influence in it.

What appeared to be the undoing of Wood and Lowden was the funding of their pre-convention campaigns. Wood's unofficial campaign manager, William C. Procter, a prominent soap manufacturer, launched an effort to raise \$1 million by tapping each of several wealthy friends for \$20 thousand each. The Lowden supporters moved to gain similar financial support for their candidate. No one had come up with a proper way to finance political campaigns, but large contributions by a few contributors were bound to raise questions about quid pro quo. Hiram Johnson and his irreconcilable fellow Senator, William Borah of Idaho, brought these funds to light through a Senate committee's investigation. Just before the convention, the committee reported that Wood had spent \$1,773,303, and that Lowden had spent \$414,000. The hopes of both declined from that point.

Ironically, both Wood and Lowden were beyond the reach of most of the senatorial and business leaders then seeking to control the presidency, and their deadlock opened the way for a candidate almost completely controllable. When the deadlock persisted, 15 party leaders gathered in a "smoke-filled room" in the Blackstone Hotel and, as Daugherty had predicted, agreed on Warren G. Harding as the compromise candidate. Their choice easily prevailed in the convention the following morning. However, in a surprising display of independence, the delegates repudiated the choice of the senatorial clique for Vice President, Senator Irvine L. Lenroot of Wisconsin, and turned instead to Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts. Coolidge had won some national acclaim with his handling of the recent Boston police strike and his telegram to Samuel Gompers: "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime."

For their part, the Democrats were almost bound to run on Wilson's internationalism and his domestic reforms. The President gave some hint that he would welcome a chance to lead the fight himself as candidate for a third term. But his failure to recover his health made this nearly impossible even if it had been otherwise feasible. Yet the very possibility of his availability tended to weaken somewhat the position of his chief supporter, his son-in-law (referred to by his political enemies as the "crown prince"), William Gibbs McAdoo. The other main contenders were Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, known chiefly for his drives against Communists during the "Big Red Scare," and Governor James Cox of Ohio. McAdoo and Palmer were the leading contenders in the convention which met in San Francisco. Cox was regarded as little more than one among several favorite sons, but as governor of a doubtful key state who had been elected three times, had survived the Republican sweep of 1918 and had an outstanding progressive record, he was a natural contender. There

was some sentiment for the able and popular Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, but he showed no interest in the race.

In the Democratic convention a two-thirds vote was required for nomination. This was an invitation to deadlock any time there were two strong rivals. At San Francisco, the delegates went through 38 ballots without a decision. Palmer then released his delegates, but most of them went to Cox rather than to McAdoo. As in the Republican convention in Chicago, a group of Democratic leaders met in a "smoke-filled room" and decided on Cox as the compromise candidate. He won on the 44th ballot.

Now, the Republican party had its candidate from the West—a must for a winner—but the Democrats also had a candidate from the West—despite their historical pattern for success. The Republicans had won the congressional election of 1918. Since the election of 1916 had been so close—9,130,000 popular votes to 8,538,000—the Republicans would be in a position in 1920 to make up the difference without difficulty.

As it turned out, this was the first national election in which woman suffrage applied across the country, and handsome Warren Gamaliel Harding won every new vote cast (in numbers not in individuals). Cox's total vote was almost exactly the same as Wilson's vote in 1916, but Harding ran the Republican total all the way up to 16,152,000. If the Republicans could hold that total, it was going to be very difficult for the Democrats to win for some time in the future.

### THE NOMINATIONS OF 1924

What might have given the Democrats hope for victory in 1924 was the revelation of scandals in the Harding administration. More sweeping and shocking than any scandal since the Grant period, the series of bribes, profit at government expense, and questionable campaign contributions and pay-offs might have embarrassed the Republican administration beyond recovery. But not so. In the 1920's, scandal did not injure Republican political fortunes, any more than had the scandals of the Grant period. On the contrary, those who exposed the scandals seemed to bring more wrath upon themselves than upon those who had perpetrated the crimes and questionable dealings.

The scandals had not yet come to light in 1922, and some segments of the economy were showing some improvement after the depression of 1920. But the Republicans suffered substantial losses in Congress. They lost 78 seats in the House, though they retained a majority of 15; their majority in the Senate dropped from 22 to 6.

Rumors and accusations of scandal attracted sufficient attention by the spring of 1923 to enable Senator La Follette to push through the Senate a



resolution calling for an investigation. Interestingly enough, it fell to a Democratic Senator, Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, to head the investigation. He made preparations for 18 months before beginning open hearings in October, 1923. The big items were the leases—secretly and with bribery at work—of naval oil reserves at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, to Harry F. Sinclair, and at Elks Hill, California, to Edward J. Doheny. But “Teapot Dome” came to be the generic term for scandals which ranged very far indeed. Secretary of the Navy Denby resigned under fire in March, 1924. Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall held up well under early questioning, but after several weeks it was revealed that he had received “loans” of \$100,000 from Doheny and nearly \$250,000 from Sinclair, and the latter had made large contributions to the Republican campaign fund. Fall resigned and was later convicted of conspiracy.

The Attorney General and the Department of Justice were themselves under suspicion of improper conduct, and special government prosecutors—Owen J. Roberts of Pennsylvania and a former Democratic Senator from Ohio, Atlee Pomerene—were appointed to handle these cases.

Daugherty at first refused to resign as Attorney General, and Coolidge resisted pressure to dismiss him until he took the Fifth Amendment before a congressional committee. Daugherty escaped conviction in a criminal trial on account of a hung jury. Members of the Justice Department, during this period of prohibition, were involved in withdrawing liquor from government warehouses and were accused of conspiracy with business interests. The custodian of alien property was found guilty of obtaining \$50,000 by the improper disposal of property and patents. The director of the Veteran's Bureau diverted \$250,000,000 from his agency to his friends and himself.

The hearings and trials dragged on for five years, and it all added up to a very complex range of improper activities. Will H. Hays, the Republican National Chairman and Postmaster General, testified in 1924 that Sinclair had contributed \$85,000 to the Republican campaign. In 1928, he admitted that Sinclair also had advanced a “loan” involving some United States bonds of \$185,000. Asked why he had not mentioned this four years earlier, Hays replied, “Because nobody asked me.”

Although Coolidge had been Vice President, and had sat in on Cabinet meetings with those involved in the scandals, his own reputation for integrity enabled him to avoid being tarnished by the revelations. On the other hand, McAdoo, again the leading contender for the Democratic nomination, may have suffered to a degree by his service as Doheny's lawyer. In 1924, Coolidge faced only a feeble challenge from Robert M. La Follette, who was trying to revive the Progressive movement at the Republican convention.

McAdoo, who had gone through the long balloting to defeat at San Francisco, faced an even greater marathon at the 1924 Democratic convention in New York's Madison Square Garden. This time McAdoo's rival was Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York. McAdoo had some reform support and support from the old Wilson forces and the South and West, and he had the backing of those who favored prohibition. Smith had the backing of Eastern liberals, but he was a Catholic and a “wet,” and he spoke out against the politically powerful Ku Klux Klan. Sitting in the oppressive July heat, the delegates went through 100 ballots without a choice. At long last they again turned to a dark-horse compromise, John W. Davis, a wealthy corporation lawyer from New York. Known as a Wilsonian liberal, a supporter of the League of Nations, and a moderate on the prohibition issue, Davis suffered from his association as counsel for the J. P. Morgan interests. In the vice presidential nomination, the Democrats sought to appease William Jennings Bryan by naming his brother, Governor Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska.

La Follette, disappointed in his efforts to gain control of the Republican party, staged a follow-up convention of his progressive forces in Cleveland a few weeks later. There he accepted the nomination of a reorganized Progressive party, and gave the vice presidential nomination to a Democratic senator from Montana, Burton K. Wheeler. With the endorsement of the Socialist party, the Farmer-Labor party, and the American Federation of Labor, he was in a position to make a strong impact on the national scene in 1924. Actually, he won the state of Wisconsin and, with 4,800,000 votes, compiled a greater number of popular votes than were cast for any third party at any other time in American history until George Wallace ran in 1968. La Follette's percentage of the total was considerably greater than Wallace's.

It should be noted, however, that while La Follette was winning nearly five million votes, the Republicans and Democrats each lost less than one million from their previous totals. Thus, La Follette drained off some votes, but, more important, he gained all the new votes (in numbers, but not in individuals). His campaign was bound to help the Republicans and harm the Democrats. Coolidge was able to retain the margin of victory which the Republicans had established. This meant that the Democrats would still face an almost impossible task in 1928, although the fact that only 52 percent of the voters went to the polls in 1924 gave them a substantial pool of non-

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*"Perhaps the great success of the New Deal led to overextension of the office of the President. There is, too, the persistent problem of financing our system of elections and the question of how to handle corruption. The growing controversy surrounding the Watergate scandals seems to indicate that these aspects of the political process—aspects of government that first emerged during the New Deal—have begun to form the substance of future political conflict."*

## American Politics after Roosevelt: 1948-1964

BY PETER B. NATCHEZ

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BY THE TIME Harry Truman became President, the Republican party had lost four elections to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Republicans disliked him personally almost as much as they disliked his legislation. The New Deal had become very controversial. However, Roosevelt held a special place in the hearts of his countrymen and could not be easily attacked. The Republican party believed that Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, was more vulnerable in this regard, but Truman, a perversely independent man, fought back with strength and with surprising skill.

There was more to the controversy than the conflict of strong personalities. The focus of political conflict after Roosevelt was the New Deal itself and the changes that it had made in American government. The Democrats argued that the New Deal rescued the economy from the Great Depression, which was true in a sense. The Depression ended during the Roosevelt presidency. And it is probably true that the New Deal brought some measure of stability to the economy and, in time, prosperity. The Democrats also argued that all this was accomplished without changing the structure of economic life: the great principles of individual freedom and private enterprise were not altered by the New Deal. Yet it took some time for the Republican party to accept this judgment, because the New Deal had changed the political landscape.

The New Deal introduced the idea that government should intervene in the economy, slowing down inflation and halting recession. In countering the adverse effects of the business cycle, Franklin Roosevelt had used the power of government to tax, to control interest rates and stock transactions, to create national debts, to fund public works, to regulate pro-

duction—particularly in agriculture—and to stimulate production in various sectors of the economy. His policies have come to be described in terms of Keynesian economics and are now practiced by most governments. However, the policies looked new and dangerous in the 1930's, especially to Republicans.

But Roosevelt was more than the manager of the economy. He was also a politician intent on establishing the Democratic coalition as the predominant force in the United States. He supported policies favorable to elements of his coalition and ignored the interests of groups that were against him. In due course, Roosevelt suggested legislation that was very helpful to labor and to those who lived in cities. He was careful to help the small farmer and he was sensitive to the needs of the immigrant populations, the ethnic vote.

But he was also attentive to the South. The South had been a solid part of the Democratic party since the Civil War. The section's strongest interest at the time was to prevent any national civil rights legislation. By and large, Roosevelt was careful to respond to the needs of his Southern supporters. In 1934, he refused to support an anti-lynching bill that had been proposed in the Congress. While sensitive to the justice of the legislation, he was plain-spoken. "I did not choose the tools with which I must work," he explained:

Had I been permitted to choose them I would have selected quite different ones. But I've got to get legislation passed by the Congress to save America. Southerners, by reason of the seniority rule in Congress, are chairmen or occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and House committees. If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill I ask Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing. I just can't take that risk.

The political problem posed by the special interests of the South was a burden for both parties. On the one hand, the Democratic party, while anxious not to lose the votes of Southern states, was under increasing pressure from its Northern wing to favor equal rights legislation. The Republican party, on the other hand, traditionally favored the idea of civil rights but was anxious to pick up the votes of discontented Southerners. Thus neither party greeted the idea of civil rights with any enthusiasm.

It was Harry Truman who broke the deadlock. Using only the power of the presidency, Truman issued a series of executive orders integrating the armed forces and insisting on fair employment practices in the federal government. In the context of the events that followed, Truman's contribution seems relatively small. The underlying problem was not very much improved. However, Truman's approach to the issue broke the political impasse. The Democratic party was committed, somewhat tentatively at first, to the idea of civil rights, while the Republican party, with some reluctance, began to accept the votes of discontented Southerners.

It must be remembered that the New Deal was composed of an extremely diverse political coalition and that each segment of the coalition was seeking legislation that was extremely controversial. The issue of civil rights was actually one of the minor conflicts of the period. The more serious battles took place between labor and capital, between large and small farmers, and between the large cities and the small towns. There were also furious contests over who should develop natural resources and who should provide electricity—the government or private enterprise.

The Democratic party tended to represent those who wanted the government to become active in these fields or (if the government did not manage investment in these areas) at least to become active in regulating them. The Republican party represented a different constellation of interests, which favored the businessman against the laborer, and rural interests against urban. Republican leaders wanted to minimize the activities of government and, at the very least, to keep the New Deal from expanding. For this alone they fought bitterly, and they achieved much through their efforts in Congress. They also exploited the errors of the Democratic administrations when they could.

## ISSUES OF THE 1948 ELECTION

By 1948, the New Deal seemed to be showing signs of wear. The New Deal was vulnerable, first, because it had created a government of considerable size without always being able to run it. There was a hodgepodge of agencies and bureaucracies. The policies of the various agencies did not always produce a co-

herent whole and, worse, there was all the painful paperwork that is associated with public administration.

The New Deal was vulnerable in another and more important way. Roosevelt's foreign policies did not always work for the best; at least they did not always work out as Roosevelt said they would. In particular, Roosevelt apparently miscalculated the intentions of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt's policies were predicated on the assumption that the Soviet Union, like the United States, desired peace through world order through the United Nations. While the Soviet Union and the United States may have a common interest in peace in the 1970's (because of the overwhelming nuclear power possessed by each nation), the two nations had few common interests after World War II.

The issue of foreign policy in World War II and in the years afterward is enormously complex and difficult to evaluate. But whatever the evaluation of history, it was clear that the Republicans had an issue. They attacked the Democrats for being soft on communism in their foreign policy, and they labeled a substantial part of the New Deal's domestic policy un-American.

With an anti-New Deal platform, the Republican party, in the person of Thomas Dewey, sought to beat Truman at the polls in 1948. It looked as though the Republicans would succeed. For his part, Harry Truman argued that Republican charges were an effort to terminate the New Deal and declared that the New Deal itself was the issue—the New Deal and the opportunities it had brought. And the Republicans helped Truman to make his case. The Republican party controlled both houses of Congress after the 1946 elections and had suggested some anti-New Deal measures. In turn, Truman, seeing some political advantage in a Republican Congress, made many legislative proposals himself, all extensions of the New Deal. He did not expect Congress to pass these proposals, but he knew that Republicans would be unpopular when they turned them down.

That Harry Truman won the 1948 presidential election was evidence of the great strength of the New Deal. After all, it had been predicted that he would lose, and lose badly. The Republicans were finally making inroads on the New Deal coalition, and it was possible that they would win. The electorate was sensitive to the anti-communism issue and to the idea that government should not expand too quickly. What the Republican party needed was a better candidate—one who was not so clearly against the New Deal.

In 1952, the Republican party was to find its perfect candidate in the person of Dwight David Eisenhower, the popular commander of the European theater in World War II and a man who seemed

to accept the logic of the New Deal. Actually, it is not quite correct to say that the Republican party "found" Eisenhower; it is more accurate to say that Eisenhower chose to run as a Republican. There was speculation that Eisenhower might be nominated as the Democratic candidate in 1948, but he had refused to be considered.

The Eisenhower-Nixon ticket was probably unbeatable from the outset. In addition to Eisenhower's commanding personal popularity and his attitude of nonpartisanship, the Republican ticket also appealed to a more traditional following by including Richard Nixon. Nixon's youth also contrasted with Eisenhower's age. Republican issues—Korea, communism and corruption—focused on areas where the performance of the Truman administration was weak. Korea and communism were powerful issues because they emphasized that the battle against communism was not going well at home or abroad. The issue of corruption was useful for two reasons. Not only did it attract attention to the scandals in the Truman administration (petty graft taken by several reasonably high-level administrators), it also emphasized the vastness of the governmental machinery created by the New Deal and the inherent problems involved in administering New Deal programs.

The Democratic party countered as best it could by nominating Adlai Stevenson and John Sparkman. Stevenson seemed like a good choice because of his great personal integrity and because he had been a successful "reform" governor in Illinois. For these reasons it appeared that Stevenson could answer the charges of corruption and that he could also use his great eloquence to defend the foreign policies of the New Deal. By adding John Sparkman of Alabama to the ticket, the Democratic party hoped to hold the South solidly in its traditional place.

Although it did not seem so at the time, 1952 was something of a watershed in American politics. Both political parties had nominated attractive and distinguished presidential candidates. The campaign itself was relatively quiet and serious. There was very little name calling, and a considerable amount of time was devoted to a discussion of the issues. In the end, the electorate did not reject Stevenson or the New Deal; rather it chose Eisenhower. And as President, Eisenhower seemed to understand the logic of the electorate's choice. He calmed Democrats who feared that the New Deal would be undone. And, perhaps more important, he convinced extreme partisans in the Republican party that they could not expect government to return to the role it played in an earlier period.

President Eisenhower was also able to bring peace (though not victory) to the Korean conflict. The peace that he produced was popular, although the

President again had a difficult time with the right wing of his own party. Indeed, Eisenhower's first term was enormously successful on every count, and it was hardly surprising that he was returned to office for a second term by a larger majority.

The Republican party did not fare so well, however. The party had lost control of Congress to the Democrats in the 1954 elections, and it was unable to regain a majority in either branch in 1952, although Eisenhower carried off 58 percent of the popular vote. Professional politicians from both parties began to wonder whether the Republican party could compete with the Democrats on its own terms without the benefit of Eisenhower's personal appeal. For their part, Democrats wondered whether their coalition would hold together or whether the various factions in the party would fly off in all directions.

### THE 1960 ELECTION

The Nixon-Kennedy contest in the 1960 election was to be a major test of each party. It would test the solidity of the Democratic party because the nomination was hotly contested by each of the party's major factions. Labor gathered behind the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, while the South was solidly behind Lyndon Johnson. The urban machines and the ethnic bloc of the party were committed to John Fitzgerald Kennedy, while the youth and the liberal wings remained loyal to Adlai Stevenson.

Kennedy emerged from these internal contests within the Democratic party with the nomination firmly in his control. It was an expensive victory. It was expensive if only from a monetary point of view. Money has always been the dark underside of political competition in the United States. But until the 1960 campaign, it could be said that no candidate had been disproportionately helped (or hurt) on financial grounds alone. To be sure, special interests of all sorts were continuously buying favors and seeking legislative advantage; but they engaged in corruption without regard for partisan affiliation. In the Kennedy campaign, money made a difference for the first time. It made a difference particularly in the West Virginia primary, where Joseph Kennedy, John Kennedy's father, simply bought up enough local political machines to insure victory in the primary. Money also made it possible for Kennedy to conduct an intensive media campaign during the primary competition.

John Kennedy would have won the nomination anyhow. He had put together a tough and highly skilled organization. And it must be said that none of the techniques used in Kennedy's campaign were new. Kennedy's campaigners were simply the first to apply these techniques to presidential politics. "Money," Harry Truman is reported to have said



with regard to the 1960 primaries, "just knowing there's unlimited money available is often enough to cause the opposition to cut and run."

In any case, John Kennedy swept through the primaries and won the nomination on the first ballot. The problem was to soothe the feelings of the candidates who lost. Humphrey and Stevenson were handled with words and expressions of sympathy. And Lyndon Johnson of Texas was added to the ticket as the vice presidential candidate. Again, this choice was purely political; Johnson would help protect the party's interests in the South.

Richard Nixon had no competition for the Republican party's nomination; that is, he had almost no competition. Nelson Rockefeller had won the New York gubernatorial race in 1958, and, by 1960, Rockefeller was casting an eye toward the presidency. There was some reason to believe that the Rockefeller candidacy could have been successful. While Nixon had the support of the Republican organization, he had never been a very popular man in his own right. Rockefeller seemed to have popularity and the personal ambition to capitalize on it. However, he was reluctant to challenge the party's leadership directly and hence decided against entering the primaries. "To become a serious contender for the nomination," Nixon later wrote of Rockefeller:

he had only one course of action open to him—to enter and win one of the earlier primary contests. When he failed to take this step, what little chance he had to win the nomination was lost. When he finally made his move, through a late spring attack on me, it was too little and too late.

Nixon's problem was not the nomination, but the election. He had to solidify his image as a moderate Republican, like Eisenhower, who held the center ground. To help him in this respect, Nixon selected Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts as his running mate. Lodge was important to Nixon because he was identified with the liberal wing of the party and because he had represented the nation's position forcefully as ambassador to the United Nations.

Nixon was thus careful to represent Republican leaders as moderate on domestic issues, competent and experienced managers of government, and tough on communism. By striking a moderate stance on domestic concerns, Nixon hoped to diminish the importance of New Deal issues in the election, thereby depriving the Democratic party of its most popular electoral appeal. In turn, Kennedy campaigned on the idea that the country had stagnated during the Eisenhower years ("We must get this nation moving again"). Equally, Kennedy took every opportunity to argue that he was tougher than Nixon on the question of anti-communism.

This last point is important. The response of the

Democratic party to the charge that it was "soft on communism" was to become every bit as "tough on communism" as the Republican party said it was, perhaps tougher. Thus the idea that it was the purpose of the United States to fight communism wherever, and whenever it appeared in the world became an uncontested part of United States policy. This assumption was accepted by both parties. The Republican party charged that somehow the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were less than patriotic; the Democratic party responded by accepting the premise that communism should be fought by the United States throughout the world. It was not until the war in Vietnam began to turn sour that this assumption was questioned.

But in 1960, the principle of anti-communism was accepted by virtually everyone in politics. Kennedy threatened to invade Cuba in order to root out communism there, and he also talked about using counter-insurgency measures to halt Communist activities in Africa and Asia. Nixon, for his part, responded by taking a stronger stand on the question of Nationalist China's off-shore islands and by reviewing the Eisenhower administration's strong record of intervention against various Communist regimes, particularly in Guatemala.

Truth to tell, there was no great difference between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon, if the 1960 campaign is used as a measure. In fact, there was not much difference between the Republican and Democratic parties in the election of 1960. The parties had more or less agreed on foreign policy questions, and politicians chose not to emphasize their differences on domestic matters. It was not surprising, then, that the election was extremely close. Kennedy won, but the margin was razor thin. Nixon received 49.6 percent of the popular vote. He ran well ahead of the Republican ticket as a whole (Republican candidates for Congress received 44.8 percent of the popular vote), and it seemed that he would lead his party again in 1964.

### THE KENNEDY COALITION

For Kennedy, the narrowness of the election was overlooked in the joy of victory. The New Deal coalition was returned to power virtually intact. But to return to power is to govern; and to govern requires policy. As the Kennedy administration began to govern, the Democratic coalition began to fragment, and Republican opposition began to solidify.

The Kennedy administration conducted foreign policy according to the precepts of anti-communism. Communist insurgents were fought more or less openly in the Congo, in Laos, and in Vietnam. In addition, Kennedy approved an invasion of Cuba. The invasion plans had been formulated by the

Central Intelligence Agency during the Eisenhower administration. The entire plan was, very simply, ill conceived. It was enormously expensive in terms of the personal costs to those who participated, and its long-run consequences for the United States were, if anything, more disastrous.

Rather than subjecting the disaster to critical debate, Kennedy personally assumed the responsibility for it, and the nation as a whole quietly forgave him. Hence, the net result of the Cuban operation was to strengthen the assumptions that produced it. The new administration felt pressured to show that its counter-insurgency operations could produce results. Consequently, the Green Berets were established by executive order, and the commitment of the United States to Laos and Vietnam deepened.

The truly remarkable thing about these commitments in Southeast Asia is that they were never strongly contested. Both the Republican and Democratic parties supported them, as did most intellectuals, businessmen, labor leaders, newspaper publishers, and scientists. The only dissent came from the small liberal wing of the Democratic party. However, this protest was subdued. For the Kennedy administration had taken up the "liberal program" in the domestic sphere, and liberals did not want to disrupt this effort.

The domestic policies of the New Frontier were the lineal descendants of the New Deal. Even the phrase, "the New Frontier," seems to have been derivative. It was first used by Henry Wallace, who was Secretary of Agriculture under Roosevelt and later served as Roosevelt's Vice President (1940-1944). As a political slogan, the New Frontier was meant to refer to urban America, and was supposed to indicate that government would move to resolve the problems that had accumulated in American cities.

In truth, Kennedy had very little idea what the New Frontier meant when he took office. The President and his staff filled in its content as they went along, in response to political pressures from their coalition. In practice, the New Frontier had four meanings in domestic politics. It meant first that the administration would make a substantial effort to encourage economic growth. Kennedy recommended to Congress that individual income taxes be cut, and that business receive a special tax credit for new investment. Further, the administration made a strong effort to hold prices down by establishing national "guidelines" and by using the power of the federal government to help business and labor follow them.

Second, the New Frontier was to include considerable activity in the area of civil rights. The emphasis of the Kennedy legislation in this area was on "equal rights," not on remedying the cumulative effects of discrimination. Thus the government sought actively to guarantee that the political process was truly open

to all. Similarly, the government became active in the area of fair employment practices and equal access to public places. While in the 1970's it is usually assumed that these rights have always been open to all, it must be remembered that equal rights were hotly contested in the early 1960's.

The Kennedy administration also tried to extend federal programs in the areas of health care, housing, and education. These were traditional New Deal concerns, and, in fact, Kennedy's proposals in these areas are properly regarded merely as extensions of earlier government efforts. However, this third area of the New Frontier provoked the most opposition during Kennedy's years in office. Both Kennedy's education and health bills failed to pass in Congress, and the housing programs were so seriously amended that they did not count for very much.

Although at the time the reasons were not clear, it was clear that there was a great deal of opposition to these concerns. Most of the opposition came from traditional Republicans, who had disapproved of the New Deal in an earlier generation and were not going to tolerate its renewal. Barry Goldwater of Arizona emerged as the spokesman for this faction. But what was curious about the Goldwater phenomenon was that Goldwater was surprisingly popular in factions of the Democratic party—in the South and among highly skilled laborers, construction workers, and small, urban homeowners. In time, these elements of the Democratic party would combine with conservative Republicans to form the basis of Goldwater's candidacy in 1964.

Finally, Kennedy's New Frontier involved the "war on poverty." Kennedy did not live to present the ideas behind this program, but Lyndon Johnson picked up the concept and presented it to the nation in Kennedy's name. Whatever the merits of the program, the war on poverty became very controversial in political terms.

The essence of the "war" involved two steps. First, poverty programs called for specialized education and training for disadvantaged segments of the population. As the Kennedy-Johnson administrations saw it, the problem with poverty was that people who were poor also received poor educations and hence often lacked the job skills required to compete in the labor market. So the poverty program was first of all directed toward compensatory education. Second, the program was directed toward actually finding good jobs for those people who had achieved adequate job skills as a result of the educational aspects of the program. This involved pressure by the federal government on various industries (usually those involved in defense, construction, or those otherwise heavily involved with the government) to employ the previously disadvantaged.

Unfortunately, the program failed to expand the

number of available jobs. Consequently, the federal government's efforts assisted the poor at the expense of those who were already working. Among the people who were paying for it, the poverty program was not popular at all. It was this discontent that undermined the popularity of the new New Deal. It also provided a new and growing constituency for Barry Goldwater.

### THE ELECTION OF 1964

Barry Goldwater's major political problem was that he was not sensitive to the kind of discontent that the war on poverty was producing. An ideological conservative, he chose to fight Lyndon Johnson in terms of the New Deal itself, rather than point to its current problems. Thus, Goldwater proceeded to attack the Democratic administration where its policies were most popular. He fought against social security and medicare, and he advocated a smaller, less active government.

Goldwater did solidify the appeal of the Republican party in the South and among those who did not favor government activity in the area of civil rights. But in a sense, Goldwater missed the new sources of discontent in the American electorate. He failed to win the votes of those who were unhappy with the way government was intervening in the economy, and he failed to attract voters who were unhappy with the way the government was intervening in the war in Vietnam. In this way, Goldwater (like George McGovern later) created the circumstances that led to a landslide victory for his opponent.

Over the years, those who mistake (or abuse) history's logic are often penalized. If it is true that Goldwater lost the election of 1964 because he did not understand the drift of public opinion with regard to the New Deal, it is also true that Lyndon Johnson won that election without understanding why he was so successful. Johnson believed that the electorate had given him a mandate to extend the war on poverty into a crusade. He also believed that the electorate had approved his strategy in Vietnam. In its handling of both wars, the Johnson administration came under increasing criticism.

Lyndon Johnson was a proud man who, sadly, became President at the wrong time. The nation desperately needed a President who could understand his critics—a man who could accept the validity of their strongest points and who could translate these arguments into good politics. However, by temperament Lyndon Johnson was extremely sensitive to criticism and even more extremely stubborn. The war on poverty and the war in Vietnam continued; in fact, both were expanded. By 1968, so much political pressure had built up within the system that Lyndon Johnson was unable to seek another term.

The political system was itself showing signs of

fragmentation. No segment of the electorate seemed happy; public trust in the institutions of government had begun to decline; the economy was increasingly out of control; and the nation was becoming ever more sharply divided. In the midst of all these problems the political system was strangely unresponsive. Political competition had been declining throughout the period, but after 1966 it seemed virtually impossible to defeat incumbent congressmen. In fact only 25 incumbent congressmen have been turned out of office in the last three elections; whereas a staggering 96 percent of them have been overwhelmingly re-elected. Political scientists are not certain of the precise causes of the success the incumbents have enjoyed, but one reason is the great ease with which incumbents can raise money for their campaigns, and correspondingly, the difficulties that non-incumbent challengers have on this score.

Campaign finance has never been a very pretty aspect of American politics. The system of private contributions to individual campaigns has tended to corrupt the political process. It has also produced the world's most expensive political system. In 1960, it was estimated that the campaign costs of all public officials totaled \$175 million, which was \$20 million more than the same races cost four years before. Richard Nixon and John Kennedy together spent \$24 million on their presidential campaigns, as well as large sums of additional money in the various primary contests. By 1972, the presidential candidates managed to spend upwards of \$90 million, exclusive of their primary expenses. The costs of campaigning for public office elsewhere in the system have increased proportionately over the years.

Clearly, many potential political candidates are discouraged by the high financial costs of political competition, and those politicians that do win are undoubtedly not so independent as they might be otherwise. But most politicians are better than their campaigns, and examples of individual corruption are not so numerous as the public imagines. The greatest burden of the present system of campaign finance is on the political system itself. It is the burden of weak and superficial political competition. Well-financed campaigns permit candidates to avoid confrontations with their opposition. Money also encourages politicians to use the mass media to their own advantage by emphasizing their attractive personal attributes while ignoring difficult issues and unpopular questions. Elections in the United States

*(Continued on page 37)*

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*"The impact of Watergate on the major political parties has heightened popular distrust of politicians and enhanced the difficulties of inducing partisan political participation. . . . In one sense, Watergate pressures on the Republican party candidates (and to a slightly lesser degree on Democratic incumbents) are somewhat unfair. . . . It is inappropriate to blame professional politicians and party regulars for scandals that arose because national campaign management was taken out of their hands."*

## Lessons of Watergate: The Nixon Campaigns

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THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS of Richard M. Nixon in 1968 and 1972 have raised serious issues about the manner in which political campaigns are financed and conducted in America. The 1972 campaign and its aftermath, the Watergate scandals, have posed a serious challenge to existing political practices and to the operation of our governmental institutions. The events of the 1968 and 1972 campaigns deserve consideration because of their implications for the use of mass-media campaign techniques, the procedures and ethics of campaign finance and the role of political party organization in national campaigns. These events also are instructive as to the effectiveness and desirability of a variety of reform proposals that were provoked by the Watergate controversy.

Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign for the presidency seemed to confirm many trends in the development of political campaigning. The heavy use of mass media was well financed and coordinated through both the pre-convention period and the general election campaign. In fact, it gave rise to a charge that the campaign was based on the imagery of Madison Avenue. This view was developed and described by Joe McGinniss in *The Selling of the President 1968*.<sup>1</sup>

However, such fear about the capacity of mass-media techniques to manipulate the votes was greatly overstated because it neglected the psychological de-

fenses that ordinary citizens have against political manipulation by "media experts." (Media campaigns are far less successful in creating new images or converting voters from old beliefs than they are in mobilizing and directing already existing attitudes and perceptions.)<sup>2</sup> Two major features of the 1968 Nixon campaign—the campaign's non-media aspects, and the low level of public support that Richard Nixon received throughout the process—were also neglected.

In 1968, Richard Nixon was not a rank outsider attempting to manipulate the Republican electorate in primaries and to manipulate potential Republican support in the general election. He had been a major national figure in the Republican party since 1950, its presidential candidate in 1960, and an extensive campaigner for Republican candidates in all those years. This enabled him to have such widespread support and confidence among Republican party leaders and the party's rank-and-file throughout the United States that all other contenders for the 1968 nomination were prevented from mounting any serious challenge to his campaign for delegates.<sup>3</sup> It was the "old" Nixon who had the support that enabled him to dominate the 1968 convention rather than any "new" Nixon created by image makers. It was also this Nixon of the 1950's and 1960's who could generate the financial support for the well-conducted pre-convention campaign.

After the Republican and Democratic conventions, Richard Nixon had the support of approximately 43 percent of the electorate; Hubert Humphrey had the support of roughly 20 percent because of the disastrous Democratic convention in Chicago and because of the assorted political problems of the Democratic party in 1968. After the extensive image ma-

<sup>1</sup> Joe McGinniss, *The Selling of the President 1968* (New York: Pocket Books, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> Dan Nimmo, *The Political Persuaders* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), chapter 1.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, *An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), pp. 247-285.



nipulation and well-financed mass-media campaign described by McGinniss and other critics, Richard Nixon received 43.5 percent of the general election vote and won the presidency by one of the narrowest margins ever recorded. Fundamentally, Richard Nixon's careful consensus-building and cultivation of Republican leaders and traditional Republican support in the electorate, the handicaps of the incumbent Democrats, and the substantial third-party candidacy of George Wallace were all far more significant for his election than were sophisticated mass-media techniques.

One legacy of the 1968 campaign that was to have implications for the future was the use of leftover 1968 campaign funds. These funds were placed under the control of the President and his immediate political associates rather than being made available to the Republican National Committee or to any of the Republican congressional campaign organizations. They were used for a variety of confidential political operations. Such practices were less significant for their immediate impact than for the precedents they created for the use of 1972 campaign funds. This was especially true with regard to the separation of funds collected for Richard Nixon's campaign from the operations of the Republican party and the campaigns of other Republican candidates for public office. The use of leftover 1968 campaign funds also confirmed a style of covert operations which probably reinforced the habits of mind and procedure that directly contributed to the Watergate scandal.

## THE 1972 CAMPAIGN

In the 1972 campaign, President Nixon enjoyed all the advantages of incumbency and exploited them thoroughly. In effect, his capacity to make news enabled him to campaign on his trip to China and Russia. These visits, with their very extensive television coverage, emphasized the President's role as a world leader and enabled him to dominate the discussion of political events throughout the spring of 1972. Incumbency also provided him with the opportunity to avoid direct debate with his Democratic opponents; he was "too busy being President," and "above" the political fray. The President's use of political "surrogates" (Vice President Spiro Agnew, Cabinet members, principal aides) to respond to Democratic charges and to make countercharges placed the Democratic presidential candidate at a disadvantage in the public policy debate, because he faced a multitude of official critics but was unable to confront his real opponent. President Nixon's role in foreign and defense policy gave him a special

prestige that permitted him to discredit opposition criticism of his defense and foreign policy as either "ill informed" or "dangerous to current international negotiations."

Perhaps the most significant political advantage of incumbency is the relative ease with which a public official can raise campaign funds in contrast to the more limited opportunities enjoyed by a challenger. Campaign contributions, in the past, have usually gone more heavily to incumbents because they already possessed government power and were typically favored to retain it. If anything, the Nixon campaign suffered from too great a capacity to raise funds.

Nixon's fund raising for 1972 began early, in part to facilitate advance planning and in part to avoid the reporting requirements that were scheduled to become effective in April, 1972, when new provisions requiring more detailed reporting of campaign contributions and expenditures became effective. Very large sums of money were raised immediately prior to this deadline. Some of these funds were directly involved in a number of the questionable campaign expenditures that came under fuller investigation later that year and in 1973. The very large amounts of money raised before and after the April deadline (totaling roughly \$50 million) enabled President Nixon to carry on the most lavishly financed presidential campaign in history. This campaign was conducted almost entirely by the Committee to Reelect the President. Relatively small portions of these funds were used to help other Republican candidates. For example, there was a very conspicuous failure to finance a Republican candidate who was making a strong challenge to Democratic Senator James O. Eastland in Mississippi. The challenger came closer to victory than other Mississippi Republicans in the twentieth century; despite the lack of national Republican assistance. This separation of the President's reelection effort from the campaigns of other Republican party candidates contributed to the Democratic party's success in retaining control of Congress and in winning races for state office, despite President Nixon's overwhelming margin of victory. There was almost none of the usual presidential coattail effect,<sup>4</sup> and this was partially due to the very negligible association that the President maintained with his party during the campaign. The results of the campaign increased the antagonism of the Republican party leadership to the White House staff which had largely conducted the reelection campaign.

The sizable funds available to the Committee to Reelect the President enabled it to conduct an extremely sophisticated campaign in terms of identifying and reaching specialized groups as targets for campaign appeals. The development and computerization of specialized lists for mailing and telephone campaigns were especially effective; the committee

<sup>4</sup> Judson L. James, *American Political Parties in Transition* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 186-187.

possessed the fiscal capacity not only to develop these lists but also to hire the necessary personnel to use them, instead of relying on the unpaid volunteers who are usually recruited in political campaigns.

The mass-media campaign was extensive, expensive and well organized. Three advertisements, in particular, aimed at Democratic candidate George McGovern were seen and recognized by a very large share of the population. Post-election research showed that the steel worker, the weather vane and the armed forces advertisements were extraordinarily vivid and effective in influencing voter response to the candidates.<sup>5</sup>

All these items illustrate, however, that it is not only the amount of money but also how well it is spent that makes a mass-media campaign and other campaign techniques effective. McGovern campaign managers spent at least \$20 million, but they produced some of the poorest and least effective television advertisements seen in recent campaigns.

In one way, the vast amounts of money raised by the Nixon campaign managers were a curse rather than a blessing. More cost-conscious campaign managers might have been less willing to allocate large sums to entrepreneurs like Donald Segretti and E. Howard Hunt to carry out their political sabotage or espionage missions which were later to become so devastating and costly to the Nixon White House and were so marginal in their direct campaign effects.

One important influence in the 1972 campaign was the April, 1972, requirement for election campaign finance reporting. It was a significant influence both in providing information about the sources of campaign contributions after April and in influencing public perceptions of the campaign process and public officials. The fact that funds raised after April were part of the public record contributed to public suspicion and doubt about the Nixon campaign funds that had been raised prior to April. The requirement for reporting campaign contributions and expenditures clearly came to exert a significant pressure on campaign practices after 1972 as a result of the investigations that followed.

## WATERGATE

The events that flowed out of the capture of a group of men breaking into and entering the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate Building, Washington, D.C., in June, 1972, have had substantial repercussions. The investigations, indictments, and public debate are far too involved to summarize here. Many elements of the chain of events are still unknown or in dispute, but even the many uncontested features of the events

labeled "the Watergate scandals" are sufficient to explain the intense public reaction and concern. Among the central features of the Watergate scandals are the indictments of many prominent political figures for actions related to the conduct of the campaign, pressure for the impeachment of President Nixon, and extensive efforts to reform campaign finance. The effects on efforts to reform political campaign finance and the impact of the scandal on the major political parties deserve special emphasis.

Testimony before investigating committees and during court trials has provided the American public with an inside picture of the financing of national party campaigns. Regardless of whether large campaign contributions did or did not involve the alleged criminal acts (such as the quashing of anti-trust actions and changes in milk price support policy), the transfer of large campaign contributions in cash provided an unappealing view of the political process. Even if further investigations and criminal trials establish the fact that the campaign finance practices of the Committee to Reelect the President were as normal and/or legal as those of previous presidential campaigns, a strong public demand for revision of campaign financing will still exist.

As the Watergate scandals expanded, Congress and all state legislatures came under heavy pressure to write new legislation to reform the conduct and finance of campaigns for public office. A variety of interest groups like Common Cause and the League of Women Voters have helped to intensify these pressures by suggesting specific alternatives and generating public campaigns for their enactment. Individual legislators (sometimes in an effort to deflect public suspicion) have also initiated legislative proposals.

These intensive efforts, however, have frequently been stymied or limited by the variety of interpretations and prescriptions for the ills in campaign financing. While there may be general agreement that big contributors may acquire disproportionate influence, there is great disagreement among reformers as to the causes and cures of this condition. Many critics urge limits on the costs of campaigns; others focus on the financing of campaigning costs. For some, the problem is getting more people to contribute; others call for limits on the size of contributions that any one person can make. Some observers focus on the contributions that come through labor unions; others are much more concerned about the capacity and likelihood of corporation contributions.

The conflicting prescriptions and objectives can be seen in the recent debate in Congress over campaign finance reform.<sup>6</sup> A bill supported by a majority in the United State Senate was delayed by a filibuster led by conservative Republicans and Democrats who were attempting to defeat the provisions for public financing of presidential campaigns. Even if it were

<sup>5</sup> *The New York Times*, February 17, 1974, p. 17; November 26, 1972, p. 39; and January 28, 1973, p. 50.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, December 4, 1973, p. 38.

to pass the House of Representatives, this legislation faces a presidential veto which will probably not be overridden. Earlier proposed legislation was shelved because it too obviously protected congressional incumbents.

Another pressure exerted on political campaigning by Watergate has been expressed in the behavior of candidates for public office. Regardless of the failure of or delay in reform legislation, many candidates for state and national office in 1974 find it necessary or useful to publish their income tax returns, to make extensive disclosures of the sources of their campaign funds, and often to limit the size and sources of acceptable contributions.<sup>7</sup> They feel the need to do so to allay the widespread mistrust about campaigns and political candidates. Public suspicion has been intensified by the revelations about the 1972 campaign and has been extended into investigations of other campaigns—for example, contributions to Democratic candidate Hubert Humprey's 1968 campaign and contributions and campaign funds received by Spiro T. Agnew before he became Vice President.

The pressure for disclosure has greatly constrained campaign finance practices, and suggests the value of campaign recording and disclosure requirements. Widespread disagreement on other elements of campaign finance reform may be the most significant limit on legislative follow-through from the Watergate scandals.

However, in 1976, the \$1.00 voluntary deductions from federal income tax returns will provide the first test of public financing of national presidential campaigns, even if no further legislation is passed. This innovation may turn out to be the next major change in the conduct of presidential election campaigns. It presents many uncertain and unexplored possibilities. It surely will have one effect that is significantly related to the problems of the 1972 campaign. It transfers responsibility for administering the expenditures of the presidential campaign from the personal organizations of the presidential candidates to their respective national party committees. This is a major reintroduction of formal party organization into the campaigning process. Thus it is a potential reversal of trends in the twentieth century that have downgraded the role of formal party organization, because it focuses responsibility for legal and ethical distribution of campaign money in a continuing and formal organization rather than in an ad hoc group tied to one individual. One of the important lessons of Watergate is the desirability of such a shift.

The impact of Watergate on the major political parties has heightened popular distrust of politicians

and enhanced the difficulties of inducing partisan political participation. The special congressional elections in the spring of 1974 demonstrated not only a reaction against Republican party candidates, but also an increased distrust of professional politicians of all parties, and lower levels of voter turnout and individual political contributions. These attitudes are reflected in the defensive behavior exhibited by political candidates on all subjects connected with campaign finance and the Watergate scandals.

The Republican party has been the more conspicuous victim of current attitudes. Republican candidates have lost four of the first five 1973 special congressional district elections, with an average decrease of 17 percent in the total turnout compared to 1972. This could be projected into a catastrophic result in the 1974 congressional elections. While it is unlikely that the same proportional loss will carry over from a special election to a general one, it is significant that more than 70 of the 187 Republicans that currently sit in the House of Representatives won their seats by less than 60 percent of their district's vote in 1972, and 40 won by less than 55 percent. Such potentially hazardous circumstances have contributed to the decision of at least 3 Republican Senators and 22 Republican Representatives not to seek reelection in 1974.<sup>8</sup> A number of potentially strong Republican candidates have also decided to defer their ambitions for higher elective office until another year and more propitious circumstances. Contributions to Republican campaign funds have declined much more sharply than have contributions to Democratic funds.

Republican candidates for office in 1974 must respond to these pressures by creating distance between themselves and the Watergate scandals. Many are conspicuously rejecting campaign support from out of state and are trying to focus on local issues. This is clearly an easier strategy for candidates for state office. It is far more difficult for Republicans in Congress to disengage themselves because they are forced to deal with the question of impeaching President Nixon. The special dilemma of House Republicans (and, to an only slightly lesser degree, House Democrats from districts in which Richard

*(Continued on page 38)*

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<sup>7</sup> Arlen J. Large, "The Year of the Pure," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 14, 1974, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Lydon, "The Awful Arithmetic," *The New York Times*, April 21, 1974, section 4, p. 1.

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VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

(Part II of this list will appear in our next issue.)

## THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE

(Continued from page 4)

data reveal no massive shifts in voters' party identification. Self-proclaimed Democrats continue greatly to outnumber Republicans as they have for more than three decades. Congressional voting patterns have been stable in recent elections, with the Democrats usually getting 53 or 54 percent of the vote cast in congressional races and maintaining safe majorities in both the United States House of Representatives and the Senate. Similarly, state electoral results disclose no discernible trend away from the Democrats, except in the South, where the Republican party is becoming more competitive in a number of states.

From this perspective, the Nixon presidential victories in 1968 and 1972 are seen as exceptional or deviating cases. Short-term factors like the Vietnam policies of the Johnson administration and the widespread voter distrust of the Democratic nominee in 1972 produced ephemeral majorities for the Republican presidential candidate. But, as with the Dwight D. Eisenhower triumphs in 1952 and 1956, these Republican victories at the top left undisturbed the basic advantage enjoyed by the Democratic party since the 1930's.

Finally, Walter Dean Burnham, a noted authority on American party politics, has questioned the appropriateness of applying the equilibrium-realignment model to current presidential politics.<sup>6</sup> In Burnham's view, what we are presently witnessing is not a realignment but a general decline in the importance of political parties. This decline is particularly evident in presidential politics. Presidential elections are highly personalized, with many voters responding less and less to party symbols and more and more to individual attributes or issue positions they associate with particular candidates. Burnham laments this trend because he fears it will result in an unstable political system, in which no durable majorities can be mobilized in support of solutions to great public issues.

In our view, the possibility of a partisan realignment occurring along the lines suggested by either Phillips or Ladd is increasingly remote. Besides the counter-evidence provided by electoral results and survey data on subjective party identification, recent events have reduced the likelihood of any fundamental partisan upheaval such as the realignment of the 1890's or the 1930's.

The Watergate scandals, coupled with Vice President Spiro Agnew's forced resignation, have clearly fragmented the Nixon majority of 1972. It will

probably be some time before Republican candidates can return to the attack on social issues like law and order and the elitism of the news media. Beyond Watergate, the resolution of the Vietnam War and the strong national determination to avoid future painful foreign entanglements mean that the focus of American politics has shifted back to domestic issues. That shift was hastened by the energy crisis and an unprecedented peacetime inflation. Social issues like busing and welfare have assumed a secondary role as worries about the economy have increased. Since these current economic issues tend to divide Americans along lines largely consistent with the partisan patterns that have prevailed since the 1930's, there is little reason why they should result in any significant realignment.

However, the absence of a realignment does not mean that the American party system is stable. A substantial number of people are now "voting for the man, not the party." This is especially true among the well educated and the young, elements of the electorate steadily increasing in size. These voters have little need for parties as simplifying, economizing agents, so the traditional functional role the parties have performed for the electorate has been reduced in importance. The American electoral system is still geared to political parties and parties remain essential agents for organizing power among public officials. For these reasons, if no others, our party system will doubtlessly survive for some time, but probably in an increasingly diminished capacity.

Whether Burnham's pessimistic forecast will be borne out, whether personalized and unstable politics will lead to an immobilized political system, remains to be seen. Certainly, the days when parties and candidates could take large segments of the electorate for granted, year in and year out, are fast drawing to a close. Each party, each candidate, must assemble a new voter coalition in every election. Consequently, after decades of regarding our party system as a system in stable equilibrium, we should now view it as a most dynamic and uncertain element in the American political system.

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## POPULAR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL REFORM

(Continued from page 19)

feated colorless but tough opposition to obtain the presidential nomination in July, 1912. Wilson's program in the campaign, the "New Freedom," sought to break up the power of large business organizations, in contrast to Roosevelt's "New Nationalism," which recognized the existence of economic bigness and proposed systematic supervision. In his early years in national affairs, Wilson combined an ability to evoke

<sup>6</sup> See Burnham, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6.

moral themes in his speeches, a cool and hard political intelligence, and a useful philosophical flexibility. The achievements of Wilson's first term offset the perennial Republican taunt that the Democrats could not govern effectively. Wilson employed presidential power even more forcefully than had Roosevelt to win passage of the Federal Reserve Act (1913), the Underwood Tariff (1913), and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914).

Despite Wilson's success as a party leader, the pressure of events pushed him and the Democrats toward policies that addressed the needs of key voting blocs like farmers, organized labor, and Progressives. After Republican gains in the election of 1914, Wilson faced difficult prospects for reelection in 1916. Accordingly, he wooed southern and western agrarian reformers, became more responsive to labor unions, and stressed the "peace" issue in the presidential contest. Against the Republicans the President marshaled a shaky coalition of the South and West, most Progressives, some sections of organized labor, and Americans who saw Wilson as a pacifist and his opposition as bellicose. In the interest groups that composed it, the Wilsonian coalition was a forerunner of the New Deal, but it was a volatile and tenuous combination, as the narrow Democratic victory indicated.

Wilson's second term subjected the Democratic party to a series of political shocks that left it in disarray by 1920. The military conduct of World War I was a success, but the home front experienced a wave of tensions. During the conflict, the Wilson administration abused civil liberties with practices that culminated in the excesses of the postwar "Red scare." The component parts of the Democratic alliance broke up in conflicts over farm policy, prohibition, and woman suffrage. After the war ended, the "high cost of living," labor unrest, and general economic dislocation further crippled the Democrats.

Woodrow Wilson's claims to presidential greatness seem likely to rest on something other than his last four years in office. Scholars recognize the appalling complexity of the problems he faced. Yet they give low marks to his management of the wartime economy and the transition to peacetime, deplore his encouragement of and acquiescence in attacks on civil liberties, and have even become more critical of his brainchild, the League of Nations. Wilson left the White House in March, 1921, a sick, broken man. His successor was Republican President Warren G. Harding. Harding's landslide election in 1920 was not simply an example of the adolescent foolishness of the American voter. A weak and ineffective President, Har-

ding was an adept candidate who built a winning campaign on pervasive discontent with Wilson, the Democrats, and reform, and thereby restored the Republicans to power.<sup>17</sup>

Historians disagree on the date when Progressivism faltered, but the inauguration of Harding marks a convenient terminal point. What had been the effects of the two and a half decades of political reform? For many groups in society the Progressive Era had meant little. The plight of blacks, the rural poor, and the unorganized urban worker remained desperate. Other significant social problems persisted. The excessive power of corporations had been restricted but not curbed enough, the situation of the cities reflected continuing ethnocultural tensions and governmental weakness, and the institutions of public policy showed unevenly the impact of Progressive effort. Ironically, in their concern to cleanse politics, the reformers had also weakened the national political organizations and had accelerated the decline of parties as governing forces. There was, in sum, ample basis for a sense of frustration and impotence among progressives as the 1920's began.

Yet too much emphasis on the negative features of the Progressive Era's politics is misleading. Constructive achievements, on balance, outweigh the drawbacks. Despite recent misuses of executive authority, the strengthening of the presidency under Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson was a healthy development. The major innovations of the period—regulatory agencies, election reforms, structural alterations—did not banish injustice from the nation. They did, however, mitigate the effects of an industrial society on many citizens. Most important, the politicians of the Progressive Era debated the principle that government bears a responsibility for the welfare of the diverse individuals and groups in society. For the succeeding half century, American domestic politics would pivot on questions of how far the reach of government should extend, which groups should receive what benefits, and what programs could best achieve desired goals. These were, in the largest sense, questions of detail. In the age of popular government and political reform, Republicans and Democrats posed the essential questions and began to frame answers that still set the limits for national political life.

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## AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER ROOSEVELT

(Continued from page 29)

have become, to an unfortunate degree, contests in advertising techniques where candidates project carefully packaged images rather than a clear discussion of the issues.

After the 1960 presidential election, Richard Nixon

<sup>17</sup> John J. Broesamle, "The Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," in Gould, *The Progressive Era*, pp. 83–113; Robert K. Murray, *The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge Era* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), pp. 2–6.

wrote that "... my view is that [television] debates between the major party candidates will be a feature of all future presidential campaigns, regardless of the candidates' own desires." Actually, confrontations between competing presidential candidates have not occurred since 1960. Lyndon Johnson declined to debate with Barry Goldwater on the grounds that such debates were unbecoming for an incumbent President; and Richard Nixon managed to avoid invitations to debate his opponents in both 1968 and 1972.

The absence of rigorous competition even at the highest level of politics is symptomatic of the malaise that hangs over our political system. Yet the political system has come a long way since the Depression and the New Deal. In a sense, the election of Richard Nixon indicated that a political era had come full circle. As the foremost critic of the New Deal, he assumed power in 1968 only to reintroduce governmental wage and price controls and formally to close out the cold war. The issue of anti-communism has been retired from politics along with the policy assumptions that followed it. The role of the federal government in stabilizing the economy also seems to have been accepted by both parties. Thus one can correctly infer that most of the political controversies that were woven into American politics for 20 years are over.

On the other hand, the 1972 campaign between Richard Nixon and George McGovern indicates that the issue of social welfare is very much alive and that the parties still remain divided on this question. However, the balance of popular sentiment in the electorate now seems to favor the position of the Republican party. In the flow of current politics, there is more concern about the structure of government and the proper distribution of its powers. Perhaps the great success of the New Deal led to overextension of the office of the President. There is, too, the persistent problem of financing our system of elections and the question of how to handle corruption. The growing controversy surrounding the Watergate scandals indicates that these aspects of the political process—aspects of government that first emerged during the New Deal—have begun to form the substance of future political conflict.

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### LESSONS OF WATERGATE

*(Continued from page 33)*

Nixon did well in 1972) is the fact that they may well vote on impeachment charges in the midst of the 1974 campaign. Therefore, their votes will be an issue which can be utilized by their opponents and which are sure to offend some sizable group within the constituency. Since the debate in the United States Senate on impeachment charges will start much

later and will probably extend over a lengthy period of time, Senators are unlikely to face similar immediate political pressures in the 1974 campaign.

In one sense, Watergate pressures on Republican party candidates (and to a slightly lesser degree on Democratic incumbents) are somewhat unfair. It could be argued that it is inappropriate to blame professional politicians and party regulars for scandals that arose because national campaign management was taken out of their hands. In both parties' 1972 presidential campaigns (but especially in the Republican campaign), regular party organization and traditional campaign practices were ignored by the personal political associates of the presidential candidates. Certainly a critical component of the decision making within the Committee to Reelect the President was its exclusive loyalty to the President and its neglect of the Republican party. These attitudes contributed to the failure of Republican party candidates to benefit from the Nixon landslide, the occasional specific decisions not to finance Republican candidates who challenged Nixon's Democratic congressional allies, and the failure to consider the long-term partisan consequences of short-term tactical choices that were designed to enhance *presidential* electoral success.

Nevertheless, many of the problems of campaign finance and the techniques that were highly publicized as a result of the Watergate scandal were not limited to the Republican campaign of 1972. Both the general problems of campaign finance and operation and their specific expression in 1972 present continuing challenges for the character of the American political process.

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### THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: 1840-1890

*(Continued from page 14)*

women were excluded from the political process. For red and black Americans, the gulf between the government and the governed was broader and more rigid after the new nation was formed than it had been during the colonial period. The nation's governing institutions dealt with these two groups through shame-faced fictions—the three-fifths compromise made slaveowners surrogate representatives for blacks through the 1850's. The government negotiated through tribal leaders in its relations with native Americans. The government consistently followed two policies in its relations with American Indians: forced migration into undesirable Western lands and racial extermination.<sup>22</sup>

The government's policies respecting black Amer-

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<sup>22</sup> Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (New York: Bantam, 1970); Rowland Berthoff, *Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 361-65.



icans were inconsistent throughout the nineteenth century. Over a long period of time, the Framers of the Constitution hoped, government policies would be shaped to end slavery, and blacks would become a part of the larger body politic, hopefully fully integrated into the political process. The abolitionists hoped to achieve these objectives through constitutional amendments, which would do for black Americans what the original Constitution had done for whites.

However, during the 1840's the South became convinced that slavery was essential for the preservation of its way of life. Southern spokesmen identified their "peculiar institution" with a superior way of life and demanded that slavery be nationalized. The South was not alone in rejecting the conservatism of the Founding Fathers. The election returns for 1860 gave a clear indication that a majority of Americans shared the South's views. Of the presidential candidates, only Abraham Lincoln stood on the platform that slavery expansion could and must be stopped, and that such a policy would doom slavery. Stephen A. Douglas, John Bell and John C. Breckinridge agreed that the conservative measures of their Revolutionary ancestors had to be modified. Lincoln won 1,866,452 votes, while his opponents collectively won nearly a million more than Lincoln. The nation had indeed become radical on the question of slavery, which meant, in essence, that it had failed to solve the issue of race relations.

From the war's end in 1865 through the early 1870's, Republicans adopted policies which promised political equality for their black brothers. Civil War amendments ended slavery, extended the protection of government to all Americans, not just whites, and prohibited voting discrimination. But as war pressures subsided, and especially as the nation became convinced that Southern states would remain loyal to the Union, the war-born need for black voters ended. Within two decades of Appomattox, white Americans were confident that blacks prevented the restoration of sectional harmony. Just as black slaves had been the central issue in sectional disharmony in the pre-war period, free blacks heightened sectional animosities in the postwar period. Further, from the perspective of Southern whites, it was obvious that critical economic problems could not be solved so long as

blacks had the ballot.

Consequently, starting in 1890, Southern states adopted Jim Crow legislation: blacks were systematically denied the right to vote, equal protection of the laws, and due process. Blacks and whites were legally segregated. Politics and government became a white man's domain. As the twentieth century dawned, black Americans enjoyed what was euphemistically termed "second class" citizenship. In reality, it was more accurately seventeenth or thirty-ninth class. Free blacks were as effectively removed from influencing their government as their slave ancestors had been.<sup>23</sup>

Culturally, the nineteenth century reflected a rural bias, and Americans used their political institutions to preserve their rural heritage in the face of continuous immigration and the rapid growth of urban centers. Certainly urbanites were not disfranchised in the sense that blacks were, but their powers to direct governing policies were significantly restricted. On the state level, urban governments were limited by the over-representation of rural areas. The same was true in the Senate, since rural-dominated state assemblies elected Senators. For practical purposes, labor organizations—assumed to be radical and open to the suspicion of foreign influences—were rendered impotent by state and national governments. Finally, to protect urbanites from themselves and to ensure rural and Protestant morality, rural Americans outlawed liquor in the Eighteenth Amendment.

Unfortunately, the dominant classes were not content to rely strictly on political methods to preserve the nation's cultural and ethnic purity. Much nineteenth-century violence had a "conservative" bias; violence was an instrument which national and state governments either deliberately used or condoned in pursuit of policy objectives. To ensure racial homogeneity in the prewar period, "gentlemen of property and standing"—recognized community and political leaders—connived with or actually led mobs in violent attacks on abolitionists. And in the postwar period, whether it was directed against blacks or Indians, violence was used by governments, which also accepted private group use of violence if it preserved cultural unity.<sup>24</sup>

Governments also indulged in and encouraged economic violence. Corporations were economic institutions formed by express sanction of government. Since unions seemed to represent cultural values which posed an ill-defined, ambiguous threat to corporate capitalism, they had to be restricted. Suffering government-sponsored violence or injunctions, unions limped into the twentieth century stripped of effective powers. As a nation "we had more violence in the conduct of labor disputes in the half-century before the trade-union movement received legitimation than did France and Germany combined."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); Jack T. Kirby, *Darkness at the Dawn: Race and Reform in the Progressive South* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972).

<sup>24</sup> Brown, *op. cit.*; Allen W. Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Mary Frances Berry, *Black Resistance and White Law, A History of Constitutional Racism in America* (New York: Appleton, 1971).

<sup>25</sup> John P. Roche, *The Quest for the Dream: The Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern America* (New York: Quadrangle, 1968), p. 15.

By century's end, the American governing system had betrayed some of the best insights of the Revolutionary generation. Men of the 1780's were convinced that government itself could destroy the very purposes for which it was instituted. They rejected the notion that there was a dichotomy of interests between the rulers and the ruled and the insidious, if not damnable, corollary that the general populace must bear the blame for internal disorder. But ironically, more Americans probably suffered from "a long train of abuses" at the hands of their government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than did British-Americans in the 1760's and 1770's.

Slowly, painfully slowly, in the new century, Americans accepted cultural and ethnic diversity, and the political process was broadened to include large segments of people who were powerless in the nineteenth century. There is still hope that economic democracy may be achieved through the political process.

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## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: 1789-1840

(Continued from page 8)

origins the "second American party system" focused upon the contest for the presidency. In 1828, a fairly well-organized opposition party, with the aid and support of many congressional leaders, elevated Andrew Jackson to the presidency; four years later the party gave him a second term. Jackson's administrations are well known because of the struggle over nullification and the "Bank War," but the degree of political party development during these years has been overstated. Voting in presidential elections from 1824 through 1832 was markedly sectional, and most states tended to favor either Jackson or his opponent. Similarly, in Congress, major issues continued to be decided in terms of sectional and regional interests throughout Jackson's first term and well into his second. Although state-oriented parties existed in some states, personal, factional and local politics generally prevailed.

Between 1834—which is usually considered the birth date of the Whig party—and 1840, this picture changed drastically. The pattern of the presidential election of 1836 was strikingly different from previous elections in that it revealed a much more balanced

national response to the two parties. However, the Whigs hardly existed at all, and political organization was still so weak that the vice presidential contest was carried into the Senate. By 1840, organizations had developed and the contest was waged, as it would be for another decade, on relatively equal grounds in all of the states. From 1836 on, partisanship structured congressional behavior, and sectionalism was distinctly muted. At the same time, state politics was increasingly dominated by parties which supported similar programs throughout the country and were elements of the same organizations that contested for the presidency and organized Congress.<sup>18</sup>

The emergence of modern political parties was accompanied by an increase in popular participation in the political process. Nearly 80 percent of the white adult males in the country voted in 1840, and increasingly greater interest centered on presidential than on state and local contests. The congressional and legislative caucuses gradually gave way to state and national conventions; this meant a shift in the focus of political authority and the growing importance of local leaders. The appearance of parties also signaled a radical change in attitudes toward patronage. In the 1830's, a generation of men appeared whose primary occupation was politics, and with them came the spoils system. It was not that earlier politicians did not replace enemies with friends, but rather that the acceptance of such actions as part of the normal political process symbolized the major shift in American political culture between 1789 and 1840.<sup>19</sup>

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## MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICS

(Continued from page 23)

voters with which to work.

Radio was just beginning to be used, and campaign expenditures were rising with each election. Estimates for 1924 ran to amounts of about \$6,000,000 for the Republicans, \$1,615,000 for the Democrats, and \$237,000 for the Progressives.

## THE NOMINATIONS OF 1928

The conventions of 1928 provided a sharp contrast to the bitterness and the length of previous conventions. In 1928, it was all cut and dried in both conventions. After Coolidge said, "I do not choose to run for President in 1928" (and then showed some signs of chagrin when party leaders took him at his word—some people still surmise that "Silent Cal" saw the Depression coming, and wanted to get out before being saddled with that), support quickly solidified around Herbert Hoover, who had been Secretary of Commerce since 1921. He was nominated on the first ballot at the Republican conven-

<sup>18</sup> McCormick, *The Second American Party System*; Richard McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics," *American Historical Review*, 65 (1960), 288-301; Thomas B. Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967); Herbert Erskowitz and William G. Shade, "Consensus or Conflict? Political Behavior in the State Legislatures during the Jacksonian Era," *Journal of American History*, 58 (1971), 591-621.

<sup>19</sup> Sidney H. Aronson, *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Services* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

tion in Kansas City. Then he went a little against tradition by naming another candidate from the West, Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, for the vice presidency. In his acceptance speech, Hoover made what would be later viewed as one of the most ironic statements in recent political history:

We in America today are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land. The poorhouse is vanishing from among us. We have not yet reached the goal, but, given a chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years, we shall soon, with the help of God, be in sight of the day when poverty will be banished from this nation.

For the Democrats, McAdoo did not renew his great battles of 1920 and 1924. Alfred E. Smith had been growing in stature and national prominence. The Governor of New York is always an "ex officio" candidate for President, and Smith was a man who had countered the Coolidge landslide in 1924 to be reelected Governor of the most populous state, and in 1926 had been elected to an unprecedented fourth term. Although Southern delegates remained cool on account of Smith's Catholicism and his support of the repeal of prohibition, Smith was nonetheless nominated on the first ballot at the Houston convention. In an effort to appease the South, Smith accepted Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas as his running mate.

Now the Democrats had their candidate from the East, the Governor of New York, no less. In 1926, they had gained a dozen seats in the House of Representatives, but were still far short of a majority. And that seven-million-vote margin of victory which the Republicans had built up in 1920 and 1924 would be difficult to overcome.

Smith did make a great effort. Indeed, he added nearly seven million votes to the Democratic total, but it was not nearly enough. Hoover, at the same time, was adding over five and one-half million votes to the Republican total. Some of this might be regarded as a temporary accretion, for many votes came from the normally Democratic "solid South." Harding had first cracked the solid South by taking Tennessee, but in 1928 Hoover added Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia—all in the Republican column for the first time since Reconstruction. A whispering campaign, focused on Smith's Catholic religion, became vicious. This had been no barrier to Smith's election as Governor of New York, but in trying for the presidency he saw his own state turn against him.

Smith suffered a landslide defeat, but in his losing campaign he made the first major strides toward assembling the national coalition which, under Franklin D. Roosevelt, would become unbeatable. His 15 million votes included a substantial number in the industrial northeast; this area from now on would be an area of Democratic strength, although it was a

region in which Wilson had carried only Ohio and New Hampshire in 1916. Smith had also borne the brunt of being the first Catholic candidate for the presidency, and perhaps in a way he eased the way for John F. Kennedy a generation later. Smith advocated a public power project at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River, farm relief, collective bargaining, and repeal of prohibition. Despite his liberal position, his campaign manager was a wealthy General Motors executive, John J. Raskob.

### THE NOMINATIONS OF 1932

By 1932, the full impact of the Great Depression was being felt, and the indicators were pointing to a Democratic victory for the first time since 1916. The Democrats had won virtual control of the House in the congressional elections of 1930; they had another strong candidate from the East, a popular Governor of New York—and a Protestant—and the margin of defeat in the preceding election did not appear to be insurmountable if Smith's urban coalition could be developed and if the solid South could be regained.

Roosevelt was easily the favorite of the Democrats, but he had to make a deal with John Nance Garner of Texas, the Speaker of the House, in order to attract Garner's Texas and California delegates, to win the necessary two-thirds. Garner accepted nomination for the vice presidency. The Republicans renominated Hoover. In the election, Hoover's vote dropped to the Republican "normal" for the 1920's—15,760,000 (almost the same vote as Coolidge's in 1924)—while Roosevelt gained all the "new" votes to push the Democratic total above 22,800,000. In an almost complete reversal of 1928, when Hoover had carried all but eight states, in 1932 he carried only six. Roosevelt's triumph in 1932 was only the first in five successive wins for the Democrats.

Roosevelt's subsequent efforts to battle the Depression won wide popular support. Although the Democrats had won a majority of 196 in the House in 1932, in 1934 they had an unprecedented victory, adding to their margin in an off-year election to win better than a three-to-one majority. Despite *Literary Digest* polls to the contrary, this pointed to almost certain Democratic victory in 1936. Taking advantage of the "no-contest" at their 1936 convention, the Democrats repealed their two-thirds rule. Governor Alf M. Landon of Kansas was chosen to be the Republicans' sacrificial lamb, and he was able to carry only Maine and Vermont.

Then some reaction began to set in. Industrial production had surpassed the 1929 level by 1936, but many New Deal measures relating to agriculture, industrial recovery, and labor remained highly controversial. Early in 1937, Roosevelt offered his "judicial reorganization plan" or, as critics saw it, the "plan to pack the Supreme Court." There was something of



an economic recession that year, and in the congressional elections of 1938, Roosevelt undertook to "purge" some of the conservative members of his own party. His efforts failed in two out of four major cases, and the Republicans gained 80 seats in the House (though they still had 93 fewer seats than the Democrats).

Under "normal" circumstances, the Democrats should have been looking for another candidate in 1940, but with the outbreak of war in Europe and the apparently growing threat to American security, Roosevelt was willing to buck tradition and stand for a third term. This cost him the backing of his old manager and national chairman, James A. Farley, and Al Smith "took a walk," but most of his substantial support remained. Roosevelt dropped John Nance Garner from the ticket as being too conservative and too old (though Garner survived all the leaders of the time) and forced unwilling delegate Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace on the convention as the vice presidential nominee.

The Republican convention was much more spirited in 1940. The leading contenders were the popular young district attorney of New York County, Thomas E. Dewey, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. But in the last weeks of the pre-convention campaign a dark horse, Wendell L. Willkie, emerged. Willkie was a New York corporation lawyer, but he retained his Indiana identification. He had opposed Roosevelt on the Tennessee Valley Authority, but he was a former Democrat with relatively liberal ideas and a sense of international responsibility. Packed galleries at Philadelphia shouting: "We want Willkie!" virtually overpowered the convention leaders, and Willkie, the amateur in politics, won the nomination on the sixth ballot. He was the most colorful Republican nominee since Theodore Roosevelt. His disarming candor and forthrightness and his determination endeared him to opponents of the New Deal, even if his liberalism caused misgivings among party regulars. Willkie campaigned across the country until he reduced his voice to a husky whisper. But in 1940 he was battling against the impact of the fall of France and fears of war and Nazi domination.

Roosevelt won another lopsided victory, but Willkie closed the gap by winning all the "new votes." Roosevelt held substantially the more than 27 million he had piled up in 1936, while Willkie ran the Republican total up to 22 million (a million votes more than Hoover had polled in 1928).

With the "no-third-term" tradition broken in 1940, there was little doubt that Roosevelt would win a fourth term—this time against Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York (again the Republicans were unsuccessful with a candidate from the East). The total vote was somewhat lower than it had been in

1940, but Roosevelt's margin was close to what it had been four years earlier. For the vice presidency, Roosevelt dropped the unpopular Henry Wallace in favor of the relatively unknown Harry S. Truman of Missouri, chairman of the Senate war investigating committee.

During the war years, Roosevelt was able to do what Wilson had not been able to do—he maintained sufficient political dominance to avoid a serious reaction to the war. The Democrats had lost control of both houses of Congress in November, 1918. Some had said that that election had come just four days too soon for the Democrats, the inference being that the armistice would have brought more Democratic votes. On the contrary, it is just as likely that the end of the war would have brought an even greater sweep against the Democrats, witness 1920. During World War II, the Democrats were able to win by comfortable margins both in 1942 and—as the war reached its climax in Europe—in 1944.

Political success and his own way of handling public opinion enabled Roosevelt to develop and maintain a position of international leadership. In the mid-1930's, Roosevelt had compromised with isolationist sentiment and endorsed the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937. In 1937, he launched a trial balloon to test internationalist sentiment. This was his "Quarantine" speech against Japanese aggression. Public opinion quickly shot down that balloon, and Roosevelt pulled back. But he was influencing public opinion to some extent.

Roosevelt faced a dilemma as Japanese expansion spread across Southeast Asia. If he did nothing, the Japanese would soon control the important resources of the British and Dutch possessions in the East Indies. If he moved strongly to prevent Japanese control, he would arouse the suspicions of isolationists. The Japanese subsequently resolved his dilemma by bombing Pearl Harbor. During the course of the war, Roosevelt was able to solidify opinion behind him. When the war drew to a close, the isolationists and irreconcilables, instead of taking over as they had in 1919, raised little objection or, like Senator Vandenberg, were converted to an internationalist position.

The great difference between the short-lived Peace of Paris, concluded in 1919, and the longer-lasting, if troubled and disorganized, peace without a treaty after World War II was the willingness of Americans to accept responsibility for a measure of stability in the postwar world. And Roosevelt's concept of American leadership lived after him. True, the Republicans would capture control of Congress in 1946, but the Democrats would win again in 1948. And even the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, working with a Democratic President, approved aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the beginning of military assistance to other countries.



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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of May, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### International Monetary Crisis

May 14—On European foreign exchange markets, the U.S. dollar falls to a new low for the year against European currencies; it recovers in late trading.

### Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

May 2—In Jerusalem, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger opens talks with Israeli leaders on a troop separation agreement with Syria on the Golan Heights. Heavy fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces along the cease-fire line is reported.

May 5—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko arrives in Syria for talks on the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights.

May 7—In Cyprus, Kissinger and Gromyko meet to discuss the Middle East situation.

May 15—3 Arab guerrillas enter the Israeli town of Maalot and seize a school, taking 90 teen-age students as hostages. They demand the release of 23 prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the students. When negotiations break down, Israeli soldiers attack the school and kill the 3 terrorists. Some 70 students are wounded and at least 16 are killed.

May 16—Israeli planes attack Palestinian refugee camps and suspected terrorist hideouts in Lebanon to retaliate for the Maalot attack. Lebanese sources report that 21 people have been killed; at least 134 are wounded.

In Lebanon, Nayef Hawatmeh, head of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, says that the attack on Maalot by 3 members of his organization was directed against Kissinger's peace mission; he charges Kissinger with failing to recognize "the national rights of the Palestinian people."

May 17—Israeli planes attack Lebanese targets for the second day.

May 21—In 2 additional reprisal raids, Israeli planes attack Arab terrorists' hide-outs in southern Lebanon. Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights exchange fire.

May 23—Israeli troops intercept and kill 6 Palestinian guerrilla infiltrators on the Golan Heights. Two captured guerrillas indicate that they planned to carry out a massacre similar to the massacre at Maalot.

May 29—Israel and Syria agree to withdraw troops from the Golan Heights. The formal agreement—the first since 1948—comes after a month of intensive shuttle diplomacy by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Under the agreement, El Quneitra is to be included in a United Nations buffer zone 1 to 4 miles wide between Israel and Syria, patrolled by U.N. troops. A 15-mile-wide limited arms zone will be established on either side of the buffer zone. Egypt and Israel signed a similar disengagement agreement in January, 1974.

May 30—Kissinger ends his month-long mission.

May 31—The Israeli-Syrian troop withdrawal agreement is signed by Israeli and Syrian representatives in Geneva. Shooting stops on the Golan Heights.

### United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Ireland*)

May 31—The Security Council votes 13 to 0, with China and Iraq abstaining, to approve a joint resolution establishing a U.N. force to supervise the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement.

### War in Indochina

May 4—The Cambodian command announces that rebels have forced Cambodian troops to give ground as the shelling of Longvek camp continues. Under siege for 5 weeks, Longvek camp, located 25 miles north of Phnom Penh, holds 25,000 refugees.

May 10—In Saigon, the Vietcong delegates walk out of a meeting of the Joint Military Commission and announce that they will not attend any more meetings until their diplomatic privileges and immunities are restored. Last month the Saigon government put an end to the weekly press conferences held by the Vietcong, cut off their telephone lines, and suspended liaison flights to the Vietcong administrative capital at Loc Ninh.

May 13—In Paris, the delegates of the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary government announce that they will suspend negotiations with the South Vietnamese delegation.

### ARGENTINA

May 7—Argentine officials disclose that the Soviet Union has pledged \$600 million in credits to help Argentina double her power-generating capacity by the end of 1977.

### AUSTRALIA

May 18—National elections are held.

May 19—Early returns indicate that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and his Labor party have been returned to power.

## **CAMBODIA**

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

## **CANADA**

(See also *India*)

May 8—In a 137-123 vote of no-confidence, the House of Commons defeats the minority Liberal party government led by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau because of the party's budget policies.

May 9—Prime Minister Trudeau calls for the dissolution of Parliament and announces that national elections will be held on July 8.

May 22—The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell W. Sharp, announces that Canada will suspend her aid to the Indian atomic energy program to protest India's nuclear test of May 18.

## **CHINA**

May 31—China and Malaysia establish full diplomatic relations.

## **DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

May 14—The main opposition group, a 5-party coalition known as "the Santiago Agreement," decides to boycott the elections scheduled for tomorrow. President Joaquin Balaguer, seeking a 3d 4-year term, is assured of reelection; only one opposition candidate of a small conservative party is left in the race. Last week 2 other opposition parties withdrew their candidates.

May 17—General elections are held. Balaguer is elected for a 3d term.

## **EGYPT**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

## **FRANCE**

May 5—Elections for a new President are held.

May 6—*The New York Times* reports that out of a field of 12 candidates, François Mitterand, a Socialist, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a conservative, received 43 percent and 33 percent respectively of the vote. Because no one received a majority of the vote, a run-off election between Mitterand and Giscard will be held on May 19.

May 19—In the run-off election, Giscard wins the presidency. The vote is 50.7 percent for Giscard and 49.3 percent for Mitterand.

May 27—Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is inaugurated as President of France. President Giscard names Jacques Chirac as Premier.

May 28—Giscard announces the new Cabinet. Jean Sauvagnargues is named Foreign Minister.

May 29—Giscard orders government files of wiretaps

destroyed and orders an end to this practice by the administration within 3 weeks "if it exists."

## **GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)**

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## **GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)**

May 6—Chancellor Willy Brandt submits his resignation to President Gustav W. Heinemann because his "negligence" permitted an East German Communist spy to become a member of his staff.

May 7—The governing Social Democratic party names Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt to succeed Brandt.

May 15—On the first ballot, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel wins 530 of the 1,036 votes in the presidential electoral college to become the new President.

May 16—Helmut Schmidt is elected and sworn in as Chancellor.

## **ICELAND**

May 6—The Liberal Left party, one of 3 members of the coalition Cabinet, withdraws from the government because of a dispute over how to control inflation.

May 9—Premier Olafur Johannesson dissolves Parliament and schedules elections for June 30.

## **INDIA**

(See also *Canada*)

May 2—700 railway union leaders are arrested as the government tries to avert a railroad strike scheduled to begin on May 6. The union breaks off talks with the government, which controls the railroads. Workers walk off their jobs at several key rail centers. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has promised to keep the railroads running.

May 8—A nationwide railway strike begins as thousands of railway workers walk off their jobs.

May 11—The railroad union rejects a government plan for ending the strike. The government has refused to open negotiations with the union until the strike call is withdrawn.

May 14—The government arrests key members of the railway union's negotiating committee.

May 15—A one-day nationwide general strike is held to support the railway workers' strike.

May 18—The government announces that India's Atomic Energy Commission has successfully exploded a nuclear device underground. India is the 6th nation to explode a nuclear device.

May 27—The railway workers' union announces an end to the 20-day-old rail strike.

May 28—George Fernandes, the head of the All India Railwaymen's Federation, who was arrested 4 weeks ago, is released from prison.

## IRELAND

(See also *U.K., Northern Ireland*)

May 17—Bombs hidden in 3 automobiles explode in Dublin. At least 23 persons are killed and 80 are critically injured.

May 18—The Irish government asks the U.N. to release 340 Irish soldiers from the U.N. force in the Middle East so that they can help guard the border with Northern Ireland.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

May 28—Premier-designate Yitzhak Rabin forms a new Cabinet. The new 3-party coalition Cabinet does not include 4 ministers of the Meir coalition—Golda Meir herself, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban. The new Cabinet will be presented to Parliament for approval later this week.

## ITALY

May 13—Final returns are announced by the Interior Minister, Paolo Emilio, on the 2-day referendum on repeal of Italy's 3-year old divorce law. Italian voters, 3 to 2, favor the divorce law.

May 28—Six persons are killed and 94 are injured when a bomb explodes at an anti-fascist rally in Brescia.

May 29—A 4-hour general strike called by the nation's 3 largest trade unions is staged to protest yesterday's bombing at Brescia.

## JAMAICA

May 16—The Jamaican government outlines plans to triple the taxes and royalties paid by foreign aluminum companies that mine bauxite on the island.

## JAPAN

May 28—The Fair Trade Commission indicts the Petroleum Association of Japan, 12 oil companies, and 17 senior oil executives on charges of price-fixing and production-control conspiracy.

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

May 27—The army indicts 52 South Koreans and 2 Japanese (out of 253 recently arrested) for trial by court martial. They are charged with involvement with a Communist-inspired student movement, outlawed on April 3, which aims to overthrow the South Korean government.

## LAOS

May 10—With the King's approval, the coalition Cabi-

net decides not to permit the opening of the National Assembly on May 11. The pro-Communist Pathet Lao believes that the Assembly has been elected illegally.

## LIBYA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## LUXEMBOURG

May 27—Premier Pierre Werner hands in the resignation of his coalition Cabinet after a serious setback in yesterday's general election. His party, the Christian Socialists, won only 18 of the 59 seats in the new Parliament.

## MALAYSIA

(See *China*)

## PORTUGAL

(See also *Portuguese Territories*)

May 6—The ruling military junta appeals for a ceasefire in the African territories—Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Vice President of the junta, asserts that rebels in the territories will be able to engage in political activity related to a referendum on their future.

May 15—General António de Spínola is installed as President of Portugal; he was named by the military junta. Spínola announces a 15-man Cabinet.

May 20—Former President Américo Thomaz and former Premier Marcello Caetano, whose right-wing government was overthrown on April 25, are flown to exile in Brazil.

May 28—Ignoring last night's warning by Air Force General Carlos Galvão de Melo that the military will not tolerate disorder, more workers join the striking transit workers, bakers, postal workers and others who are protesting working conditions and demanding more pay.

May 29—General de Spínola warns against anarchy as scattered strikes spread.

May 30—Wildcat strikers begin to return to work.

## Portuguese Territories

### ANGOLA

May 20—The Portuguese government orders troops to shoot only if fired on first.

May 27—For the first time since the military coup, a ban is placed on all street demonstrations and political activities. The fear that racial tensions will lead to violence precipitated the ban.

### MOZAMBIQUE

May 5—Several thousand whites gather in front of City Hall in Lourenço Marques to demand that Portugal's ruling junta maintain control over Mozambique.

May 11—General Francisco da Costa Gomes, a member of the ruling junta in Portugal, says that the war against the rebels in Mozambique will continue if the guerrillas do not accept Portugal's offer of a cease-fire.

May 22—In front of the Governor-General's palace in Lourenço Marques, 3,000 striking dock workers gather to demand more pay and better working conditions from Antonio Almeida Santos, visiting Portuguese minister in charge of overseas territories.

### PORTUGUESE GUINEA

May 25—Portugal's Foreign Minister Mario Soares begins formal talks with a delegation from Portuguese Guinea. The Guinean delegation represents the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. The immediate goal is a cease-fire between Portuguese and rebel forces in Guinea. The long-range goal is independence for the Portuguese territories.

### THAILAND

May 21—Premier Sanya Dharماسक्ति and his 28-man Cabinet resign after serving for 8 months; the country is placed on military alert.

May 24—At the request of the National Assembly, Premier Sanya agrees to return to office and to form a new government.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Argentina; U.K., Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

May 13—In Moscow, visiting East German Premier Horst Sindermann meets with Soviet Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev and Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin.

May 21—A Soviet-Libyan communiqué is issued at the end of Libyan Premier Abdul Salam Jalloud's week-long visit to the U.S.S.R.; the Soviet Union and Libya promise to give "every assistance" to the cause of the Palestinian rebels.

May 27—As part of the campaign to increase Soviet influence in the Arab states, the Kremlin sends Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to Syria and Defense Minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko to Algeria for talks with the countries' leaders.

### UNITED KINGDOM

#### Great Britain

May 6—According to government sources, Britain and the Soviet Union have signed a 10-year agreement for economic, scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation.

May 8—The 1-day-old strike by the Union of Engineering Workers ends when an anonymous donor pays \$156,000 in fines and damages levied against the union for an illegal strike several months ago.

### Northern Ireland

(See also *Ireland*)

May 14—The Assembly votes to approve the establishment of the Council of Ireland, to provide links between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

May 15—Militant Protestants stage a general strike to protest the establishment of the Council; they use force to keep people from their jobs.

May 19—The British government declares a state of emergency. The strike causes major power cuts and a paralysis of the economy. Leaders of 3 Protestant loyalist parties issue a statement in support of the strike.

May 20—Militant Protestants bring activity in Belfast to a standstill.

May 22—It is announced that 500 more British troops will be sent to Northern Ireland, bringing the total number of British soldiers there to 16,500.

In an important concession to the Protestant extremists, the provincial government announces that it will modify its plans for the establishment of the Council of Ireland. The first step in moving toward the establishment of the Council will be limited to joint meetings between ministers from Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

May 24—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces that there will be no negotiations with the Ulster Workers' Council, which is attempting to bring down the provincial government in order to force new elections. The British government is supporting the present coalition executive, comprised of Protestants and Catholics.

May 27—British troops are stationed at gasoline stations and oil storage depots as the general strike threatens a complete shutdown of vital services.

May 28—Brian Faulkner, Chief Minister of Northern Ireland's 5-month-old coalition government, resigns in the face of the continuing general strike of Protestant dissidents.

May 29—The Ulster Workers' Council calls off the general strike.

Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announces that direct rule will be imposed de facto on the province. The provincial assembly is suspended for 4 months. No new elections are promised.

### UNITED STATES

#### Administration

May 7—Secretary of Agriculture Earl J. Butz announces that the administration has agreed to release the \$120 million in frozen funds appropriated for rural water and sewer grants.

May 10—President Richard Nixon announces an emergency program to make available \$10.3 billion



in additional mortgage money to help the private housing market.

May 29—Francine Neff is nominated by President Nixon to be U.S. Treasurer. She succeeds Romana Acosto Banuelos, who resigned February 14.

## Economy

May 10—The First National City Bank in New York raises its prime interest rate to 11.5 percent. Other New York City and out-of-town banks follow suit.

May 20—The First National Bank of Chicago raises its prime rate to 11.75.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

May 21—The Export-Import Bank grants a \$180-million loan at 6% interest to the Soviet Union to help finance construction of a large fertilizer complex. The current Export-Import Bank rate is 7%.

May 31—It is announced in Washington and Moscow that President Nixon will meet Soviet Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev in the Soviet Union for a week beginning June 27.

## Labor and Industry

May 16—The Standard Oil Company of California agrees to pay \$120 million in back wages to 160 discharged employees and to rehire 120 of them, in settlement of a case brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

## Legislation

May 1—In a 57-31 vote, the Senate refuses to grant the Nixon administration the power to reimpose wage-price controls as provided by the Economic Stabilization Act that expired last night.

May 6—The Senate votes, 43 to 38, to deny an administration request for an accounting change that would allow the Defense Department to spend an additional \$266 million in military aid to South Vietnam in the current fiscal year. The Defense Department remains under its obligation to observe the \$1.126-billion ceiling on military aid for South Vietnam imposed by Congress.

May 23—A bill providing a \$566.9-million increase in benefits to veterans disabled in service is sent to President Nixon by the House.

## Military

May 14—President Nixon names Air Force General George S. Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will succeed Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. General David C. Jones is appointed to the post of Air Force Chief of Staff, succeeding Brown.

## Political Scandal

May 1—In U.S. District Court, President Nixon's lawyer, James St. Clair, asks Judge John J. Sirica to quash an April 18 subpoena for tapes and records of 64 White House conversations by Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski.

Voting 20 to 18, the House Judiciary Committee rejects the President's delivery of transcripts instead of tapes in response to their subpoena of April 11.

May 2—The House Judiciary Committee votes to give St. Clair a limited role in defending President Nixon during the committee's hearings.

The Maryland Court of Appeals orders that former Vice President Spiro T. Agnew be disbarred; last October, Agnew pleaded no contest to tax evasion charges.

May 7—Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Republican leader in the Senate, says that the transcripts of White House conversations relating to Watergate have revealed "immoral performances" by the participants.

In a news conference, St. Clair announces that President Nixon has decided not to hand over any more tapes relating to Watergate either to the House Judiciary Committee or to Special Prosecutor Jaworski.

May 9—The House Judiciary Committee begins hearings in closed session on the possible impeachment of President Nixon.

May 11—At a news conference, Julie Eisenhower, President Nixon's daughter, asserts that the President will not resign as long as he has the support of at least one Senator.

May 15—Dwight L. Chapin, former appointments secretary to the President, is sentenced to 2 concurrent sentences of 10 to 30 months each for lying to a Watergate grand jury about political sabotage directed at candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination during the 1972 campaign.

The House Judiciary Committee issues 2 new subpoenas for White House tapes and other documents.

May 16—Richard G. Kleindienst, former U.S. Attorney General, pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., to a minor criminal offense for failing to answer accurately and fully certain questions when he testified before the Senate in 1972 during an investigation of the handling of antitrust cases against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. The charge was filed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Jaworski.

May 17—In Florida, a county judge dismisses a 1-count indictment against Senator Edward J. Gurney (R., Fla.), who was charged with violating a state election law on campaign contributions.

The former president of the Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers pleads guilty to contributing \$50,000 illegally to the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President in 1972.

May 20—Judge Sirica orders President Nixon to turn over to the courts 64 subpoenaed tapes or documents of White House conversations relating to the cover-up of the break-in of Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C., on June, 17, 1972. Judge Sirica rejects the argument of the President's lawyer, James D. St. Clair, that the conflict with Jaworski over the tapes subpoenaed April 18 is an intra-executive affair, and that Jaworski cannot take the President to court.

May 21—Judge Sirica sentences Jeb Stuart Magruder, deputy director of President Nixon's reelection campaign, to 10 months in prison for his part in the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

The Senate Judiciary Committee passes a resolution of support for Watergate Special Prosecutor Jaworski, who has complained that President Nixon has attempted to limit his authority.

May 22—In a letter to Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D., N.J.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, President Nixon refuses to comply with the May 15th subpoenas for more Watergate-related, White House tapes and documents.

May 23—In a decision upholding a lower court ruling, a U.S. Court of Appeals rules that there is "no compelling need" for the President to turn over 5 subpoenaed tapes to the Senate Watergate Committee (which originally subpoenaed the tapes in July, 1973), because President Nixon already released the original transcripts to the House Judiciary Committee on May 2, 1974.

Vice President Gerald Ford urges the President to release all the relevant evidence to the House Judiciary Committee.

May 24—U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell rules that: "The Government must comply with the strict constitutional and statutory limitations on trespassory searches and arrests even when known foreign agents are involved." He also declares that "national security" is no justification for the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in 1971.

St. Clair appeals Sirica's May 20 ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals. One hour later, by-passing the Court of Appeals, Jaworski asks the U.S. Supreme Court to decide at once whether a claim of executive privilege can block his access to the 64 White House tapes he subpoenaed April 18. (See *U.S., Supreme Court*, May 31.)

May 28—Leon Jaworski petitions U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica to turn over tapes that the judge has withheld as irrelevant.

May 29—The House Judiciary Committee ends

its closed hearings on the Watergate cover-up. May 30—The House Judiciary Committee votes to issue a 4th subpoena to the President asking for additional White House tapes. In a letter to the President, the committee formally warns the President that his refusal to honor subpoenas may "constitute a ground for impeachment." The committee also votes to continue its hearings in closed session; the President's relations with the dairy industry and with International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation are to be investigated.

The President agrees to give White House files relating to 2 defendants in the White House "plumbers" case to Watergate prosecutors and the defendants' attorneys; he reserves the right to withhold national security documents.

## Politics

May 28—Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.) loses the contest for his Senate seat in the Arkansas Democratic primary election.

## Supreme Court

May 13—The Supreme Court refuses to review a lower court ruling that the International Business Machines Corporation hand over 700 documents that the Justice Department says it must have in order to prosecute antitrust charges against IBM. IBM announces that it will make the documents available at once.

The Supreme Court rules that a group of narcotics sellers were illegally convicted in 1970 because the Department of Justice had obtained evidence under invalid wiretapping orders. The Court says that the requirements for a wiretap order under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1968 were not properly fulfilled.

May 28—Ruling 6 to 3, the Court declares that all identifiable parties to a class action must be notified of the lawsuit and that the person bringing the suit must pay to notify all such persons; otherwise a class action suit must be dismissed. The 3 dissenting justices agree with the general conclusions of the majority.

May 31—The Supreme Court agrees to an accelerated review of the U.S. District Court ruling of May 20 that the President must surrender 64 subpoenaed tapes to Jaworski. The President has claimed executive privilege in withholding the tapes. (See *U.S., Political Scandal*, May 20, May 24.)

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl. War in Indochina*)

## YUGOSLAVIA

May 30—At the 10th Communist party congress, President Tito is named head of the party for life.

# Political Divisions in the U.S. Congress: 1855-1973

[All figures reflect immediate result of elections]

		Senate					House of Representatives				
Congress		Num- ber of Senators	Demo- crats	Re- publi- cans	Other parties	Va- cant	Num- ber of Repre- sentatives	Demo- crats	Re- publi- cans	Other parties	Va- cant
34th	1855-1857	62	42	15	5		234	83	108	43	
35th	1857-1859	64	39	20	5		237	131	92	14	
36th	1859-1861	66	38	26	2		237	101	113	23	
37th	1861-1863	50	11	31	7	1	178	42	106	28	2
38th	1863-1865	51	12	39			183	80	103		
39th	1865-1867	52	10	42			191	46	145		
40th	1867-1869	53	11	42			193	49	143		1
41st	1869-1871	74	11	61		2	243	73	170		
42d	1871-1873	74	17	57			243	104	139		
43d	1873-1875	74	19	54		1	293	88	203		2
44th	1875-1877	76	29	46		1	293	181	107	3	2
45th	1877-1879	76	36	39	1		293	156	137		
46th	1879-1881	76	43	33			293	150	128	14	1
47th	1881-1883	76	37	37	2		293	130	152	11	
48th	1883-1885	76	36	40			325	200	119	6	
49th	1885-1887	76	34	41		1	325	182	140	2	1
50th	1887-1889	76	37	39			325	170	151	4	
51st	1889-1891	84	37	47			330	156	173	1	
52d	1891-1893	88	39	47	2		333	231	88	14	
53d	1893-1895	88	44	38	3	3	357	220	126	11	
54th	1895-1897	88	39	44	5		357	104	246	7	
55th	1897-1899	90	34	46	10		357	134	206	16	1
56th	1899-1901	90	26	53	11		357	163	185	9	
57th	1901-1903	90	29	56	3	2	357	153	198	5	1
58th	1903-1905	90	32	58			386	178	207		1
59th	1905-1907	90	32	58			386	136	250		
60th	1907-1909	92	29	61		2	386	164	222		
61st	1909-1911	92	32	59		1	391	172	219		
62d	1911-1913	92	42	49		1	391	228	162	1	
63d	1913-1915	96	51	44	1		435	290	127	18	
64th	1915-1917	96	56	39	1		435	231	193	8	3
65th	1917-1919	96	53	42	1		435	210	216	9	
66th	1919-1921	96	47	48	1		435	191	237	7	
67th	1921-1923	96	37	59			435	132	300	1	2
68th	1923-1925	96	43	51	2		435	207	225	3	
69th	1925-1927	96	40	54	1	1	435	183	247	5	
70th	1927-1929	96	47	48	1		435	195	237	3	
71st	1929-1931	96	39	56	1		435	163	267	1	4
72d	1931-1933	96	47	48	1		435	216	218	1	
73d	1933-1935	96	59	36	1		435	313	117	5	
74th	1935-1937	96	69	25	2		435	322	103	10	
75th	1937-1939	96	75	17	4		435	333	89	13	
76th	1939-1941	96	69	23	4		435	262	169	4	
77th	1941-1943	96	66	28	2		435	267	162	6	
78th	1943-1945	96	57	38	1		435	222	209	4	
79th	1945-1947	96	57	38	1		435	243	190	2	
80th	1947-1949	96	45	51			435	188	246	1	
81st	1949-1951	96	54	42			435	263	171	1	
82d	1951-1953	96	48	47	1		435	234	199	2	
83d	1953-1955	96	46	48	2		435	213	221	1	
84th	1955-1957	96	48	47	1		435	232	203		
85th	1957-1959	96	49	47			435	234	201		
86th	1959-1961	98	64	34			<sup>3</sup> 436	283	153		
87th	1961-1963	100	64	36			<sup>4</sup> 437	262	175		
88th	1963-1965	100	67	33			435	258	176		1
89th	1965-1967	100	68	32			435	295	140		
90th	1967-1969	100	64	36			435	248	187		
91st	1969-1971	100	58	42			435	243	192		
92d	1971-1973	100	54	44	2		435	255	180		
93d	1973-1975	100	56	42	2		435	243	191	1	

<sup>1</sup> Democrats organized House with help of other parties.

<sup>2</sup> Democrats organized House, due to Republican deaths.

<sup>3</sup> Proclamation declaring Alaska a State issued Jan. 3, 1959.

<sup>4</sup> Proclamation declaring Hawaii a State issued Aug. 21, 1959.

Source: *Factual Campaign Information*;  
compiled by the Senate Library, revised 1973.

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